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In the past decade, major retailers nationwide have begun to
employ a private, for-proﬁt system to settle criminal disputes, extracting
payment from shoplifting suspects in exchange for a promise not to call
the police. This Article examines what retailers’ decisions reveal about
our public system of criminal justice and the concerns of the agents who
run it, the victims who rely on it, and the suspects whose lives it alters.
The private policing of commercial spaces is well known, as is private
incarceration of convicted offenders. This Article is the ﬁrst, however, to
document how industry has penetrated new parts of the criminal
process, administering sanctions to resolve thousands of shoplifting
allegations each year.
Proponents of private justice claim that everyone wins. Critics say
it’s blackmail. The Article takes a tentative middle ground: While
“retail justice” is not the American ideal, it may nonetheless be
preferable to public criminal justice, at least if certain conditions are
met. Rather than cancel the private justice experiment, therefore, as
several states are poised to do, the government should aim to foster
optimal conditions for its success.
Extending the central analysis, the Article then shows how the
study of private justice leads to fresh perspectives on important criminal
justice issues. It suggests, for example, that the costs to crime victims of
assisting the prosecution may be a feature of the system, not a bug, if
they encourage victims to invest in efficient crime-deterring precautions.
It also complicates legal academic models of police and prosecutorial
behavior built on maximizing arrests and convictions. The Article
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INTRODUCTION
Most shoplifters evade detection and many who fail are never
formally punished. For decades, retailers battling theft have relied on a
mixture of law enforcement and self-help, sending some suspected
shoplifters to the station house and others to the street. Recently, a third
option has emerged, raising basic questions about the interplay between
public and private forces in American criminal justice. Some retailers
now hand over shoplifting suspects not to the police but to a for-proﬁt,
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specialist corporation like the Corrective Education Company (CEC).1
This “retail justice company” extracts payment from the alleged offender
in exchange for a “restorative justice” course and a promise not to
pursue criminal charges. The retailer pays nothing; in fact, in some cases,
it reaps a portion of each suspect’s payment.
“Retail justice” is becoming a big business. CEC’s clients, for
example, have included Walmart, Abercrombie & Fitch, Bloomingdale’s,
DSW, and Burlington Coat Factory.2 CEC reports an enrollment rate of
roughly ninety percent, yielding thousands of “students” each year.3 It
offers discounts and payment plans for suspects who cannot ﬁnance the
entire $400 fee at once and “scholarships” for the poorest few.4 CEC
claims its program saves retailers time and money, relieves pressure on an
overtaxed criminal justice system, and cuts recidivism by providing “life
skills and motivation for reintegration.”5
The City of San Francisco, in contrast, alleges that CEC is little more
than an extortion racket preying on the city’s residents.6 The Indiana
Attorney General has reached the same conclusion,7 and a privateplaintiff class has sued participating retailers and CEC personnel for
violating the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.8
There is no scholarly treatment, legal or otherwise, of this private
“retail justice system.” Private dispute resolution is of course common on
the civil side.9 And civil enforcement sometimes stands in for criminal
1. For a detailed description of CEC and one of its main competitors, see infra section
I.C.
2. Restorative Justice for Retail Theft, CEC, https://www.correctiveeducation.com
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter CEC] (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
3. Id.
4. Id. Terms like “students” and “scholarships” are placed in scare quotes to reﬂect
ambivalence about their usage. Retail justice companies employ the terms to analogize
their programs to other sorts of educational coursework. See infra notes 190--193 and
accompanying text. Critics, however, resist the analogy in light of concerns about the
voluntariness of the decision to enroll and pay the “tuition” that is discounted by the
“scholarship.” See infra section II.A.1.
5. CEC, supra note 2.
6. See Complaint for Injunctive and Equitable Relief and Civil Penalties for
Violations of Business and Professions Code Sections 17200 at 3, People ex rel. Herrera v.
Corrective Educ. Co., No. CGC-15-549094 (Cal. Super. Ct. ﬁled Nov. 23, 2015), 2015 WL
7709993 [hereinafter S.F. Complaint] (“[T]hreatening accused shoplifters with criminal
prosecution unless they pay CEC hundreds of dollars violates California’s extortion laws.”).
7. See 2018 Op. Ind. Att’y Gen. No. 4, at 6–7, 2018 WL 1722444 (opining that CEC’s
activities may fall within the Hobbs Act’s proscription of extortion).
8. See Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act at 1, Doe v. Walmart Inc., No. 3:18-cv-2125 (N.D. Cal. ﬁled Apr.
9, 2018), 2018 WL 1709735 [hereinafter Walmart Class Complaint].
9. In addition to obvious examples like civil arbitration, recent work has highlighted
the signiﬁcant dispute-resolution function of corporate customer service departments and
intermediaries like credit card companies. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as
Courthouse, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 547, 551 (2016).
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justice to rectify wrongs that violate parallel civil and criminal laws. Yet
rhetoric imagining a state monopoly over enforcement of the criminal
law persists.10 This supposed monopoly is itself of relatively recent
vintage.11 And it has never been absolute. Consider, for example, the
local diner that lets the neighborhood vandal repay a debt by washing
dishes,12 or the role of violent vigilantism in our national narrative.13
Private adjuncts to criminal justice institutions are common, too, like
diversion programs or private probation. What is novel here is the way
“private justice”—wholly divorced from the criminal justice system—has
become routinized and institutionalized in a mass, for-proﬁt industry,
with buy-in from criminal justice actors.
Seminal work by Professors Elizabeth Joh, Ric Simmons, David
Sklansky, and others has documented the extent to which “private
police” prevent and investigate crime and apprehend suspected
offenders.14 Separate research plumbs the private prison15 and
10. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 84–88 (2012)
(discussing “the state’s monopoly on criminal justice”); Adam B. Cox, Enforcement
Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31, 35 (“[T]here are
parts of the criminal law where a single state actor . . . has a meaningful monopoly on
enforcement within a particular jurisdiction.”); Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law:
Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1859, 1859
(1999) (“We are accustomed to seeing criminal law enforcement as an exclusive state
prerogative.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4
J. Legal Stud. 1, 30–31 (1975) (“With few exceptions, there is a public monopoly—more
precisely a series of public monopolies—of criminal-law enforcement.”); Ric Simmons,
Private Criminal Justice, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 911, 918 (2007) [hereinafter Simmons,
Private Criminal Justice] (“[T]he provisioning of criminal justice services, at least beyond
the ﬁeld of law enforcement, remains the exclusive province of the state.”).
11. See Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, supra note 10, at 921–23, 971 (describing
the historical evolution from private to public criminal law enforcement).
12. See generally Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1131 (2011)
[hereinafter Simmons, Private Plea Bargains] (discussing various types of informal private
bargaining between criminal offenders and victims).
13. See generally Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in
the 19th-Century American South (1984) (exploring the history of violence and patterns
of crime and punishment during slavery and Reconstruction in the American South);
Richard Maxwell Brown, Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and
Vigilantism (1975) (tracing the history of violence and vigilantism from the American
Revolution through 1970).
14. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 Utah L. Rev.
573, 609–15 [hereinafter Joh, Conceptualizing] (creating a typology of policing activities
in which private police engage); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 51 (2004) [hereinafter Joh, Paradox] (arguing that “private
police participate in much of the policing work that their counterparts do”); Simmons,
Private Criminal Justice, supra note 10, at 919–21 (documenting the ubiquity of
monitoring and investigating by private police); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46
UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1178–80 (1999) (discussing activities of private security personnel,
including patrol work or acting as “cop[s] on the beat”).
15. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 Duke L.J. 437,
457–62 (2005) (arguing that private prisons increase the likelihood the state will impose
punishments that are inhumane or gratuitously long); Malcolm M. Feeley, The
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probation16 industries. But private criminal adjudication and sanctions are
terra incognita—or maybe El Dorado, mythical altogether.17 “Shopkeepers do not always report those they have caught,” one recent article
begins, “but we have never heard of a shoplifter and storekeeper agreeing to a payment beyond restitution to settle the matter conﬁdentially.”18
CEC and its competitors, on the storekeeper’s behalf, do precisely that.
This Article begins, then, as a case study in the routinized, private
settlement of a particular type of criminal dispute. The subject offense—
shoplifting—is a minor crime with “major economic and social consequences.”19 The New York Times has called shoplifting “the nation’s most
expensive crime.”20 Retailers’ losses from shoplifting approached $18

Unconvincing Case Against Private Prisons, 89 Ind. L.J. 1401, 1419–21 (2014) (arguing
private prison arrangements may “respect the dignity and minimize the deprivation of liberty
of criminal offenders”).
16. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register
Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 1483, 1496–98, 1507–09 (2016) (arguing
that private probation companies whose proﬁts derive entirely from fees paid by offenders
are a “classic conﬂict of interest”); Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary
Criminal Justice, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1175, 1193 (“It is . . . common for profit-oriented private
firms to contract with the government to provide probation services.”). See generally
Christine S. Schloss & Leanne F. Alarid, Standards in the Privatization of Probation Services:
A Statutory Analysis, 32 Crim. Just. Rev. 233 (2007) (examining the history of and statutory
requirements for private probation).
17. “In the 16th and 17th centuries, Europeans believed that somewhere in the New
World was a place of immense wealth known as El Dorado.” Willie Drye, El Dorado, Nat’l
Geographic, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/archaeology-and-history/archaeology/
el-dorado [https://perma.cc/6CXW-GNMW] (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
18. Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Conﬁdential Settlements in Civil, Criminal,
and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 311, 345 (2018); see also, e.g., Simmons,
Private Criminal Justice, supra note 10, at 911, 936 (asserting that “[p]rivate criminal
law . . . is currently limited to the law enforcement stage of the process” and that “private
entities perform . . . none of the adjudication and almost none of the dispositions in the
criminal justice system”); cf. Sklansky, supra note 14, at 1277 (“If we know little about the
private police, we know even less about private adjudication.”). One seemingly
authoritative volume on “privatizing the United States justice system” is divided into three
parts: police, adjudication, and corrections. While the sections on police and corrections
are predictably rich, the brief section on adjudication contains only two pages touching on
criminal law, which propose that crime victims be permitted to hire attorneys to assist the
prosecution. See Tim Valentine, Private Prosecution, in Privatizing the United States
Justice System 226, 226–28 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992).
19. See, e.g., Paul Cromwell & Brian Withrow, The Dynamics of Petty Crime: An
Analysis of Motivations to Shoplift, in Crime Types 242, 243 (Dean A. Dabney ed., 2d ed.
2013) (arguing that shoplifting “should be more widely and systematically studied”).
20. Susan Konig, Helping Shoplifters to Reform, N.Y. Times (Sept. 29, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/29/nyregion/helping-shoplifters-to-reform.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also Rachel Shteir, The Steal: A Cultural History of
Shoplifting 93 (2011) (noting that criminologist Ronald V. Clarke has called shoplifting
“one of the ‘most common but least reported and detected crimes’ in the world”).

2256

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:2251

billion in 2016, or almost $50 million every day.21 The effects of
shoplifting reach both far and deep. At least one in nine Americans
shoplifts at some point in life;22 more than ten million people have been
picked up in the last ﬁve years alone.23 Shoplifting is a “crime of moral
turpitude” that can catalyze exclusion or deportation for a noncitizen
offender.24 And it famously triggered a life term for Gary Ewing, who left
a pro shop with a trio of golf clubs lining his pants leg.25
In addition to its parochial signiﬁcance, this private justice industry
raises and informs broader questions of legal theory and practice. The
Article explores these questions, traveling from the local to the global
across four parts. Part I begins with a social history of shoplifting and
review of the pertinent criminological literature. The focus is on who
offends, why they do it, and how industry and the legal system have
traditionally responded. Each of these inquiries informs the normative
analysis the Article later undertakes: The “who” identiﬁes the population
principally affected by retail justice, necessary, among other things, to
weigh distributive effects. The “why” helps predict how shoplifters would
likely react to various deterrent measures. And the “how” reveals the
baseline against which to evaluate retail justice.
Part I then documents how retail justice has transformed the
practice of shoplifting enforcement to date. Shifting legal and economic
pressures make the retail justice universe highly dynamic. The facts
described here are best understood as a snapshot of this nascent industry
and its most prominent pioneer. By the time this Article goes to print, in
fact, CEC may be defunct.26 There are signs of reincarnation, however,27
21. See Richard Hollinger, Nat’l Retail Fed’n, 2017 National Retail Security Survey 6,
8 (2017) [hereinafter Hollinger, 2017 Survey], https://nrf.com/system/tdf/Documents/
NRSS-Industry-Research-Survey-2017.pdf?ﬁle=1&title [https://perma.cc/B8BE-V5T6].
22. Carlos Blanco et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Shoplifting in the United
States: Results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related
Conditions (NESARC), 165 Am. J. Psychiatry 905, 909 (2008); see also id. at 911 (advising
that this estimate “may represent a lower boundary of the true prevalence of shoplifting”).
23. Shoplifting Statistics, Nat’l Ass’n for Shoplifting Prevention, http://www.
shopliftingprevention.org/what-we-do/learning-resource-center/statistics [https://perma.cc/
DUL6-GXBJ] (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
24. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Deported for Shoplifting?, Wash. Post (Dec. 29, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/12/29/deported-for-shoplifting/
1a30b527-195a-433f-9d55-77e86fa4894e [https://perma.cc/CTN8-3EJD]; John E. Hogan &
Amy B. Herbold, Collateral Consequences: The Potential for Deportation and Exclusion as
a Result of a Municipal Court Shoplifting Conviction, N.J. Law. Mag., Dec. 2010, at 25, 25.
25. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17–18, 20 (2003) (upholding a twenty-ﬁve
year to life imprisonment sentence under California’s recidivist statute).
26. As of July 30, 2018, CEC’s website was no longer publicly accessible. For an
archive of the previously accessible website, see CEC, supra note 2.
27. CEC’s LinkedIn page describes a company called 3 Peak Solutions whose business
model sounds identical to CEC’s. 3 Peak Solutions, LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/
company/corrective-education-company (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited July 30, 2018).
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and CEC’s principal competitor continues to do business.28 Considering
the forces that gave rise to retail justice in the ﬁrst place, evolution, not
extinction, is the most probable future course.
Part II conducts a preliminary evaluation of the retail justice system.
If the media’s reception is any indication, the very concept will make
some readers squirm. Likewise, the sole judicial decision on point
characterizes the “irreducible core of CEC’s program” as “textbook
extortion under California law.”29 These views are understandable but,
upon deeper reﬂection, more problematic than they ﬁrst appear.
The “criminal compromise agreement” (or “restorative justice
agreement”) the parties sign is a contract that, according to the standard
Pareto assumption, should make them better off.30 The Pareto assumption fails, however, when the conditions for efficient contracting are
absent—if suspects are coerced or misinformed, for example, or if
negative externalities, such as insufficient (or inefﬁcient) general deterrence, result. Part II exhaustively—yet tentatively, given our incomplete
understanding of this evolving industry—analyzes these potential
“market failures,” sidelining some and ﬂagging others for lawmakers’
attention. Part II also considers the potential distributive effects of retail
justice—whether we should expect its harms and beneﬁts to be visited
equally upon different social groups. Part II’s recurring theme is that,
while retail justice may not be ideal, it may still be preferable to criminal
justice. Private justice, in fact, is the predictable result of, and a potential
palliative for, aggressive policing and harsh criminal penalties.
That is not to say the California court was wrong in concluding that
retail justice meets the legal test for extortion, or blackmail. After all, the
retailer allows the suspect to pay money in exchange for a promise not to
report a crime. The justiﬁcations for criminalizing blackmail, however, do
not support a ban on retail justice. Even if retail justice is blackmail, in
other words, it should not be illegal. Regardless of what one thinks about
blackmail generally—a question probed in an extensive legal and
philosophical literature—the reasons for its prohibition are at their
weakest in this setting. This argument plows no new ground. But it does
show why the normative debate about blackmail matters more than
previously thought. Rather than an occasional victim who seeks
compensation by threatening to accuse the perpetrator of a crime, retail
justice is a burgeoning, large-scale industry. Primarily “academic” debates
about blackmail are academic no longer.
28. See Turning Point Justice, http://turningpointjustice.com [https://perma.cc/
B323-KFQY] (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
29. People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Educ. Co., No. CGC-15-549094, slip op. at 3
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2017) (granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff).
30. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1
J. Legal Analysis 737, 738 (2009) [hereinafter Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Plea Bargain]
(discussing “the standard Pareto argument that a contract entered into freely by two
parties necessarily improves the situation of both parties”).
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The upshot of Part II is that the normative valence of retail justice
depends upon empirical facts about its implementation and the
environments in which it operates. Rather than ignoring retail justice or
trying to stamp it out, lawmakers can direct their efforts to ensuring that
it works fairly and efficiently. Part III brieﬂy makes recommendations
toward this end, focused on retail justice companies’ communication
with suspects, retailers’ crime-prevention initiatives, and the collection
and reporting of aggregate crime data that retail justice masks.
Part IV extends. It demonstrates how the study of private justice
generates fresh perspectives on important criminal justice issues, such as
the understudied role victims play in preventing crime.31 Well-oiled
criminal justice institutions, the Article contends, may actually discourage
some victims from investing in socially desirable crime-deterring precautions. In other words, we may want the criminal justice system to be costly
for victims when it would be cheaper for victims to prevent crime by
taking precautions than for the public authorities to capture and punish
offenders. We also want to concentrate public resources where they will
not reduce private incentives to take precautions, such as when victims
cannot afford precautions or will suffer irreparable harm from crime,
and thus will purchase precautions regardless of public enforcement.
Part IV also highlights what retail justice teaches us about police and
prosecutorial preferences. Critics claim that private justice usurps the
prosecutor’s charging prerogative. Yet retail justice companies operate
with the knowledge and (at least tacit) approval of criminal justice
authorities. Where retail justice reigns, prosecutors still exercise
discretion—they simply do so at a wholesale rather than retail level.
The arrangement is more decriminalization than abdication. That
prosecutors are willing to forgo so many easy cases, moreover,

31. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal
Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 299, 303–08 (1996)
[hereinafter Ben-Shahar & Harel, Economics] (criticizing legal scholarship’s “perpetratorcentered perspective”).
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complicates academic models of prosecutors who seek to maximize
convictions or conviction rates.32 The same is true for police and arrests.33
Finally, Part IV begins to generalize and speculates about the future
of private justice. CEC’s ambitious “vision is to reinvent the way petty
crimes are handled, starting with retail theft.”34 Part IV considers the
conditions that conduce to a model of “offender-funded” private justice
like CEC’s, to begin to identify where else the model might work. An
“offender-funded” model is best supported when a small group of victims
each suffers a large number of low-level, nonviolent harms by known
offenders, and the existing options for deterring those harms are ﬂawed.
Part IV also suggests that other large institutions, like universities and

32. See, e.g., George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph 48–49 (2003); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50, 106–07 (1968);
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463,
2471 (2004); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1128 (2008)
[hereinafter Bowers, Punishing the Innocent]; George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A
Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. Rev. 98, 114 (1975); Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber,
The Political Economy of Prosecution, 5 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 135, 143 (2009); Robert
L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 1036, 1045, 1071 (1972); Eric Rasmusen et al.,
Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice, 11 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 47,
52 (2009); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J.
Legal Stud. 43, 50–52 (1988); Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The
Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 Judicature 335, 337 (1990). Other
models assume that prosecutors seek to maximize sentence years. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill
& Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & Econ. 353, 357 (2006);
Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S.
Attorneys, 7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 379, 380 (2005); William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61, 63 (1971); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Sentencing
Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Plea Bargaining, 31 RAND J. Econ. 62, 69 (2000). For
a skeptical take on these models, see Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States:
Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 Va. L. Rev. 939, 987–89 (1997).
33. See, e.g., Inimai Chettiar et al., Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Reforming Funding to
Reduce Mass Incarceration 24–25 (2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/publications/REFORM_FUND_MASS_INCARC_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NUKFYPX]; Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use
of Force 189–90 (1993); Stephanos Bibas, Improve, Dynamite, or Dissolve the Criminal
Regulatory State?, in The New Criminal Justice Thinking 61, 61 (Sharon Dolovich &
Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) [hereinafter The New Criminal Justice Thinking]; Josh
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute,
110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1695 (2010) [hereinafter Bowers, Legal Guilt]; Stephen D.
Mastrofski et al., Expectancy Theory and Police Productivity in DUI Enforcement, 28 Law
& Soc’y Rev. 113, 117 (1994); Elina Treyger, Collateral Incentives to Arrest, 63 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 557, 564 (2015); cf. Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law
Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. Legal Stud. 105, 107–08 (2016) (developing a
model showing that police officers have unusually strong preferences for punishment and
thus derive utility from making arrests).
34. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11, People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Educ. Co.,
No. A149195, 2017 WL 1366020 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2017), 2016 WL 6037455 (emphasis
added).
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employers, might support a distinct model of private justice that
outsources adjudication rather than sanctions.
In the end, understanding private justice sharpens our view of the
criminal justice system. And understanding the criminal justice system—
in all its manifold institutions, including the unconventional ones at its
margins—is an essential step toward ﬁxing it.35 To be sure, private justice
sits uncomfortably in the contemporary criminal justice landscape. Its
ends, however, may turn out to justify its means. After all, the public
system’s severity is the private system’s sustenance. The way out of private
justice, for those who so desire, is not to squelch it but to starve it.
Mollifying the criminal justice system would reduce both suspects’
demand for private alternatives and the ability of private intermediaries
to extract rents in the form of hush money.
I. THE PATH TO PRIVATE JUSTICE
Leading economic and criminological theories struggle to explain
the incidence of shoplifting because, unlike many crimes, shoplifting
steamrolls race, class, age, and gender lines.36 To sketch out a sense of
who shoplifts and why, section I.A thus begins with a brief social history
of shoplifting and overview of the criminological literature. This
discussion identiﬁes the individuals potentially affected by retail justice
and helps to predict how they will react to the incentives retail justice, or
its alternatives, provide. Section I.B describes how retailers and criminal
justice authorities have traditionally responded to shoplifting, identifying
the baseline against which to evaluate retail justice. Section I.C details
how retail justice works and what it claims to accomplish.
A.

Who Shoplifts and Why?

A caveat is required at the outset. It is difficult to determine, at any
point in history, who is shoplifting and how much. Experts draw inferences
from three imperfect sources: store apprehension statistics, criminal justice
data, and self-report studies. Changes in the first two measures may reflect
shifts in either commission or detection of shoplifting. Self-report studies
may be more reliable, though respondents’ incentives to over- or
underreport may vary with cultural norms (over time or among social
groups) or even the manner in which a survey is administered.37
35. See Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Mapping the New Criminal Justice
Thinking, in The New Criminal Justice Thinking, supra note 33, at 1, 1 (“If we are to fix the
current criminal system . . . we need a complete and nuanced understanding of what exactly
this system is: What social and political institutions, what laws and policies, does it
encompass?”).
36. See Cromwell & Withrow, supra note 19, at 242 (“[Shoplifting] is widely
distributed in the population and appears to cross racial, ethnic, gender and class lines.”).
37. See Lloyd W. Klemke, The Sociology of Shoplifting: Boosters and Snitches Today
7–9, 34–37 (1992) [hereinafter Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting].
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Speciﬁcally, every era since the 1870s has experienced a supposed
shoplifting “epidemic.”38 Yet it is unclear, in each period, whether people
were shoplifting more or retailers were catching them more often. Similar difficulties plague the “who” question: There is a “range and variety
of selective factors that bring about the [apprehension] of a shoplifter
and perhaps bring him to official attention.”39 As one commentator put
the point, due to “self-fulﬁlling prophecies” about criminality, “the
shoplifting statistics ‘created’ by security personnel may not accurately
reﬂect shoplifting reality.”40
These difficulties are handled in two ways. First, when possible,
multiple data types and sources are used to triangulate the facts. Second,
when sources conﬂict, descriptions are hedged accordingly.
1. A Century of Petty Theft. — Shoplifting ﬁrst captured public
attention shortly after the Civil War, as department stores proliferated.41
In this new retail setting, shop owners could no longer monitor the
entire premises, forcing them to rely on clerks who had relatively weaker
incentives to prevent theft. At the same time, customers were newly
allowed to browse unsupervised and goods were moved to open display,
making them easier to secret away.42 Women were thought to do most of
the pilfering.43 “[F]emale fashion,” it was said, “afforded a lot of spacious
hiding places for articles,” giving female thieves a technological advantage over men.44 Doubtless more important, department stores successfully cultivated an almost exclusively female customer base.45
38. Id. at 19.
39. Mary Owen Cameron, The Booster and the Snitch: Department Store Shoplifting
25 (1964). Cameron’s study of shoplifting in 1940s Chicago department stores found that
black shoppers were “kept under much closer observation than whites” and adolescents
were “under almost constant observation.” Id. at 31. Such scrutiny biases upwards
estimates of black and adolescent offending.
40. Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 120.
41. See, e.g., Elaine S. Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving: Middle-Class Shoplifters
in the Victorian Department Store 4–5 (1989) [hereinafter Abelson, Middle-Class
Shoplifters]; Kerry Segrave, Shoplifting: A Social History 3 (2001).
42. See Segrave, supra note 41, at 17–18.
43. See Pilfering from Stores, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1883, at 5, 5, https://www.
nytimes.com/1883/03/04/archives/pilfering-from-stores-the-methods-and-results-ofshoplifting.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting a store owner who
estimated that, in 1883, “[f]ully nineteen-twentieths” of shoplifters were female). The best
academic treatment is Abelson, Middle Class Shoplifters, supra note 41. Notorious
shoplifters of the era included ladies with colorful pseudonyms like “light-ﬁngered Sophie
Lyons,” “Long Mary Moore,” “Frenchy Johnson,” “Black Lena” (who was white), and “Kid
Glove Rosie.” See Segrave, supra note 41, at 3–6.
44. Segrave, supra note 41, at 3 (“Women carried purses of various sizes, wore outﬁts
with long voluminous skirts, and were often decked out in shawls, gloves and muffs.”); see
also id. at 15 (“One woman had a hollow heel fashioned in her shoes, another had puffs of
hair lacquered to extra stiffness, to act as a receptacle for small items.”).
45. In 1904, for example, Macy’s estimated that as many as ninety percent of its patrons
were women. Elaine S. Abelson, The Invention of Kleptomania, 15 Signs 123, 136 (1989).
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Women charged with shoplifting often “accused the stores of permitting too much freedom: they became ‘over excited’ and over stimulated
in the large stores[,]” which afforded them the “‘deplorable liberty’ to
touch everything.”46 Some medical experts agreed—items on open
display, they argued, were temptations “better than Satan himself could
devise.”47 These women, moreover, were increasingly “well-to-do, of good
character.”48 Many retailers overlooked petty thefts by wealthy women or
allowed the offenders to pay their way out of trouble.49 Kleptomania—a
“distinctive, irresistible tendency to steal,”50 thought principally to afflict
women—came in and then out of fashion as a defense.51 Yet all the way
into the 1950s, the middle- or upper-class woman remained the
archetypal offender.52
During the 1950s and ’60s, shoplifting gradually came to be seen as
an adolescent problem, initially still concentrated among females in the

46. Id. at 139 (quoting Paul Dubuisson, Les Voleuses des Grands Magasins, 16
Archives d’Anthropologie Criminelle 1, 342 (1901)).
47. Patricia O’Brien, The Kleptomania Diagnosis: Bourgeois Women and Theft in
Late Nineteenth-Century France, 17 J. Soc. Hist. 65, 72 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Paul Dubuisson, Les Voleuses des Grands Magasins 43 (1902)); see also
Michael B. Miller, The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869–
1920, at 200–05 (1981) (describing contemporary, nineteenth-century medical opinion
about the irresistible nature and degrading effects of department stores on human—
especially female—morality).
48. Segrave, supra note 41, at 7, 18–19; see also, e.g., Shoplifting in the Great
Department Stores, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1908, at 64, 64, https://timesmachine.
nytimes.com/timesmachine/1908/04/26/104802462.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Shoplifting in the Great Department Stores] (“The shoplifters that
we are afraid of are not the professional thieves, nor the poor people who steal from
need . . . . The dangerous ones are the rich and inﬂuential women who either yield to a
temporary impulse of temptation or are afflicted with a sort of degenerate tendency
toward kleptomania.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a shop detective)).
49. See Segrave, supra note 41, at 7–8, 11 (describing how upper-class women in the
United States and abroad were treated when arrested for shoplifting).
50. O’Brien, supra note 47, at 70 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
C.C.H. Marc, a French physician).
51. See Segrave, supra note 41, at 18–26. Individuals with kleptomania are now
understood to constitute a small proportion of shoplifters and a very small fraction of the
public. See, e.g., Brian L. Odlaug & Jon E. Grant, Impulse-Control Disorders in a College
Sample: Results from the Self-Administered Minnesota Impulse Disorders Interview
(MIDI), 12 Primary Care Companion J. Clinical Psychiatry, no. 2, 2010 (ﬁnding that,
although 28.6% of college students surveyed reported having stolen an item in their
lifetime, only 0.4% met the diagnostic criteria for kleptomania).
52. See, e.g., Segrave, supra note 41, at 18–26; Alex J. Arieff & Carol G. Bowie, Some
Psychiatric Aspects of Shoplifting, 8 J. Clinical Psychopathology 565, 566 tbl.1, 567–68
(1947); Cracking Down on Shoplifters, Bus. Wk., Nov. 1, 1952, at 58, 61. Taking a slightly
different position, Mary Owen Cameron argues, based on her 1940s downtown Chicago
sample, that “well-to-do women shoplift in department stores considerably less frequently
than middle- and lower-class women.” Cameron, supra note 39, at 119.

2018]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC.

2263

middle and upper classes.53 “[T]he under-21 group,” wrote one reporter,
was then “on the greatest shoplifting spree in our history.”54 Abbie
Hoffman’s Steal This Book ushered the trend into the 1970s,55 when, for
the ﬁrst time, researchers also began to ﬁnd that male offenders
outpaced females.56 In the 1980s, the number of thefts known to the
police skyrocketed, though the causes are unclear.57
Early research on the racial and ethnic breakdown of shoplifters is
scarce. Many stores did not collect (or release) these data and the
premier shoplifting datasets excluded them.58 A handful of studies from
the 1970s and ’80s found similar patterns of shoplifting activity across

53. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 39, at 102; Gerald D. Robin, Patterns of
Department Store Shoplifting, 9 Crime & Delinq. 163, 167 (1963). For popular accounts,
see Bill Davidson, They Steal Just for the Hell of It, Saturday Evening Post, May 18, 1968, at
23, 24; Fredelle Maynard, The Housewives’ Crime, Good Housekeeping, Oct. 1967, at 99,
154. Sociologists had documented adolescent involvement in shoplifting much earlier.
See, e.g., Clifford R. Shaw, The Natural History of a Delinquent Career 57–58, 66–68
(1931).
54. Earl Selby, Youthful Shoplifting: A National Epidemic, Reader’s Dig., Apr. 1967, at
95, 95. A 1965 FBI report called shoplifting the nation’s fastest growing form of larceny, up
ninety-three percent over ﬁve years. See John Edgar Hoover, Message from the Director,
FBI L. Enforcement Bull., Dec. 1965, at 1, 1.
55. Abbie Hoffman, Steal This Book (1971); see also Mass Retailing Inst., Store
Thieves and Their Impact 7 (1973) (reporting, based on a survey of 1,188 stores, that a
majority of shoplifters were under eighteen years of age). Roughly one-quarter to one-half
of juveniles polled admitted to having pilfered. Compare Changing Morality: The Two
Americas, Time, June 6, 1969 (reporting that 23% of Americans admit to having
shoplifted), and Michael D. Geurts et al., Researching Shoplifting and Other Deviant
Customer Behavior Using the Randomized Response Research Design, 51 J. Retailing,
Winter 1975–1976, at 43, 46 (reporting that 28.2% of survey participants with
characteristics representative of young adults between the ages of fourteen and twentyeight in Honolulu had shoplifted during the prior year), with Nat’l Coal. to Prevent
Shoplifting, Shoplifting and the Law 8 (1980), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffiles1/
Digitization/81811NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3YN-P5C6] (citing studies reporting that
49% of high school students admitted to having shoplifted at least once), Amin elDirghami, Shoplifting Among Students, 50 J. Retailing 33, 33 (1973) (citing a study
reporting that roughly half of shoplifters are under twenty years of age), and Lloyd W.
Klemke, Exploring Juvenile Shoplifting, 67 Soc. & Soc. Res. 59, 61 (1982) [hereinafter
Klemke, Juvenile Shoplifting] (ﬁnding a majority of 1,189 high-school students had
shoplifted at some point in their lives).
56. See, e.g., Klemke, Juvenile Shoplifting, supra note 55, at 61 & tbl.1; Shoplifting
Keeps Pace with Inﬂation, Security Mgmt., July 1978, at 27, 29 exh. 1. For a review of
numerous additional studies from the 1970s and ’80s, see Klemke, Sociology of
Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 47–50.
57. Because self-reported shoplifting statistics held steady in the 1980s, Klemke
concludes that “the increase shown in [known thefts] is more likely to be a product of
changes in apprehension and reporting practices than a real increase in shoplifting
behavior.” Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 8.
58. See id. at 50–51.
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racial groups of youth.59 A single self-report study on adults found higher
levels of general theft behavior among nonwhites than whites.60
2. Contemporary Evidence. — Shoplifting remains widespread today—
recall that more than ten percent of the population has shoplifted at
least once, generating $50 million in losses each day.61 On the “who”
question, the modern view may consist of the unhelpful observation that
“there is no ‘typical shoplifter.’ . . . [S]hoplifters come from varying
social, age, and economic groups.”62 Very likely there is geographic
variation as well. Nevertheless, the best data support a few tentative
generalizations. Two sources are especially useful: (1) sociologist Lloyd
Klemke’s review of the social science literature through 1992; and (2) the
National Epidemiological Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions
(NESARC), a large-scale, nationally representative survey from 2001 to
2002.
First, “there is a great deal of consensus that shoplifting is most frequent in the early part of the life cycle and that it declines as individuals
move through the life cycle.”63 NESARC, for example, found that twothirds of shoplifting cases occur before age ﬁfteen.64
Second, contemporary evidence “appears to overwhelmingly support the conclusion that males are typically more active in shoplifting
than females.”65 NESARC found that nearly sixty percent of shoplifters
were male.66
Third, “racial and ethnic patterns of who shoplifts” seem to “vary
dramatically in different places and times.”67 “The limited research on
race and ethnic variations in shoplifting,” Klemke ﬁnds, “suggests that
only minor differences are evident in the population at large.”68 NESARC
shows something slightly different: “Native Americans had higher odds
[of shoplifting] than whites, although blacks, Hispanics, and Asian
Americans had lower odds of shoplifting than non-Hispanic whites.”69

59. See id. at 54 (reviewing studies); Saul Astor, Shoplifting: Far Greater than We
Know?, Security World, Dec. 1969, at 12, 12 (“[R]ace seems to have nothing to do with
theft.”).
60. See Charles R. Tittle, Sanctions and Social Deviance: The Question of Deterrence
87 tbl.4.3 (1980).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23.
62. Thomas Brad Bishop, The Law of Shoplifting: A Guide for Lawyers and Retail
Merchants 6 (2007).
63. Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 44.
64. Blanco et al., supra note 22, at 911.
65. Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 50 (summarizing research).
66. Blanco et al., supra note 22, at 906 tbl.1.
67. Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 55.
68. Id. at 64.
69. Blanco et al., supra note 22, at 909.
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Native-born Americans also reported shoplifting at higher rates than
those who are foreign born.70
Finally, the bulk of the evidence suggests that middle-class individuals are most likely to shoplift. In NESARC, shoplifting “was signiﬁcantly
more common in individuals with at least some college education,
among those with individual incomes over $35,000 and family incomes
over $70,000, and . . . less common among those with public insurance.”71 Still, Klemke does ﬁnd “slight to moderate inverse relationships
between social class and shoplifting behavior,” suggesting the truly
wealthy are infrequently involved.72
As for the cause, the evidence is mixed. Klemke, a sociologist, reads
the evidence to support sociological explanations, while the psychiatrists
interpreting NESARC emphasize psychiatric ones. “[I]t is highly likely,”
Klemke begins, “that some shoplifters ﬁt the pathological conception,
others are best seen as societal victims, and many others ﬁt the frugal
customer conception”—that is, their motivation “‘is the same as for
normal shopping: the acquisition of goods at minimum cost.’” 73 But in
general, Klemke writes, recent studies “conclude that most shoplifters are
characterized by relatively normal psychological health and personalities
that are indistinguishable from non-shoplifters.”74 They are not
professionals “boosting” goods for resale. Klemke concludes that
sociological theories stressing the individuals’ relationship to their
environment can best explain who offends.75
The NESARC data, however, challenge the notion that shoplifters
resemble nonshoplifters along psychiatric dimensions. Researchers
found that “[t]he prevalence of all antisocial behaviors was higher
among individuals with a history of shoplifting than among those with no

70. See id. at 906 tbl.1.
71. Id. at 909; see also Bishop, supra note 62, at i (“There are very few people stealing, as
in Les Misérables, for a loaf of bread.”); Cameron, supra note 39, at 118 (reporting that
apprehensions were not concentrated on individuals from the “slum and ‘ghetto’ areas of
Chicago”).
72. Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 64.
73. Id. at 78 (quoting Robert E. Kraut, Deterrent and Deﬁnitional Inﬂuences on
Shoplifting, 23 Soc. Probs. 358, 365 (1976)).
74. Id. at 86 (emphasis omitted).
75. On the structural (macro) level, there is some evidence consistent with strain
theory, which views deviance as animated by frustration with barriers to economic success.
See id. at 87–88, 93. On the individual (micro) level, both economic and noneconomic
motivations (such as peer pressure and sporting) seem to play a role. See id. at 88–93. And
among juveniles, “shoplifting . . . is more frequently committed by youth who are less
strongly bound to the social order (family and school).” Id. at 97. Further, shoplifting is
more frequently committed by youth whose peers endorse the behavior. Id. at 97–105
(applying socialization reinforcement theories to shoplifting).
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self-reported history of shoplifting.”76 And because many of the behaviors
associated with shoplifting can be “understood as a manifestation of
impulsivity,” the authors concluded, “our ﬁndings are most consistent
with the understanding of shoplifting as a behavioral manifestation of
impaired impulse control.”77
B.

Private and Public Enforcement of Shoplifting Laws

As societal understandings of who shoplifts and why have evolved, so
have industry and state responses to the crime. This section traces the
path that led to the creation of a market for retail justice companies. As is
shown, the enforcement model has long been shot through with
ambivalence and discretion. Recognizing this reality is crucial when
evaluating the changes that retail justice has wrought.
1. Ambivalence and Innovation. — From the earliest public reports of
shoplifting, retailers have been ﬁckle and ambivalent about formal law
enforcement. Shoplifting hurts the bottom line, but overly aggressive
enforcement can too. Wrongful arrests can trigger lawsuits,78 and even
legitimate arrests might hurt business by scaring away customers who fear
being falsely accused.79 Many Progressive Era retailers, for these reasons,
pressed charges only selectively.80 They hired store detectives to help spot
known shoplifters and pooled information with other stores.81 Although
retailers periodically resolved to toughen up,82 they mostly released

76. Blanco et al., supra note 22, at 909. In addition, almost ninety percent of
individuals with a history of shoplifting had received at least one psychiatric diagnosis,
compared to around ﬁfty percent among nonshoplifters. Id. at 910.
77. Id. at 911; see also Nat’l Coal. to Prevent Shoplifting, Program Guide 6 (1980),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/74730NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3UT-Q686]
[hereinafter Nat’l Coal. to Prevent Shoplifting, Program Guide] (ﬁnding that, of almost
25,000 students who had shoplifted, nearly seventy percent claimed to have decided to
steal only after they were in the store).
78. As early as 1878, the New York Times reported on a $150 damages award to a woman
who had been wrongly accused of stealing a purse. See Editorial, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1878, at 8,
8, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1878/05/28/80683929.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
79. See The Woman Who Pilfers, N.Y Times, May 31, 1878, at 3, 3, https://
timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1878/05/31/80684395.pdf (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (quoting a shopkeeper who heard from customers that they were
almost too afraid of false accusations to come into his store).
80. One defense lawyer estimated in 1906 that, of the 4,000 individuals arrested for shoplifting in New York each year, only about 700 made it into court and only 50 were convicted.
Shoplifting in New York, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1906, at 15, 15, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1906/01/02/101761298.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
81. See Segrave, supra note 41, at 12.
82. See, e.g., Shoplifting in the Great Department Stores, supra note 48.
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ﬁrst-time suspects after making a record of the offense.83 Wealthy women,
in particular, were often able to buy their way out of prosecution.84
By the 1950s, retailers could take advantage of new loss-prevention
technologies like closed-circuit cameras.85 States, too, began to enact
“merchant’s privilege” laws, shielding retailers from suit for false arrest as
long as probable cause supported a suspect’s apprehension.86 Within ten
years, almost every state had one.87 As crime rates then ballooned in the
1960s and ’70s, states raised criminal penalties88 and enacted “civil
recovery” statutes authorizing retailers to obtain super-restitutionary
damages.89 Arrests rose, too,90 despite lingering retailer ambivalence
about justice-system involvement.91
By 1988, thirty states had passed civil recovery laws, which typically
granted retailers a substantial civil penalty in addition to actual
damages.92 Retailers—or specialist ﬁrms that serviced them—sent formal
83. One major trade group in New York amassed a database of 55,000 known
shoplifters. See Maude Miner Hadden, Shoplifters of Many Types Mingle with the Shoppers,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1933, at 15, 15, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/
1933/12/17/105831556.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
84. See George C. Henderson, Light-Fingered, Sunset Mag., Jan. 1927, at 14, 14.
85. See Segrave, supra note 41, at 46, 48.
86. See id. at 47.
87. Id. at 58.
88. See, e.g., Nev. Anti-Shoplifting Comm., What to Do About Shoplifters 5 (1977),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/40662NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/L97L-9846]
(describing a new statute authorizing up to ten years in prison and a ﬁne of up to $5,000 if
the property stolen is worth more than $100).
89. See, e.g., 1976 Cal. Stat. 5047 (codiﬁed at Cal. Penal Code § 490.5) (providing
that an unemancipated minor who steals may be held civilly liable to the merchant for
between ﬁfty and ﬁve-hundred dollars, plus costs and the value of the item if it is not
returned in its original condition).
90. The number of shoplifting arrests essentially tripled between 1970 and 1976. Tis
the Season to Be Wary, Time (Dec. 12, 1977), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,915813,00.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). And the number of
retail thefts known to the police more than doubled between 1973 and 1980. Klemke,
Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 8 tbl.1; see also Rising Wave of Shoplifting—and
No Solution in Sight, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 2, 1970, at 56, 56 (explaining how
shoplifting “in all sections of the U.S. is going up at an alarming rate”).
91. See, e.g., Inst. for Local Self-Gov’t, Private Security and the Public Interest 97
(1974) (“In our survey involving [private police], . . . 80% reported there were certain
types of criminal incidents which were not reported to the police. These included . . .
shoplifting . . . . [T]he most common practice in this private system of justice is to . . .
release suspected shoplifters or maintain private listings of known criminals, especially
shoplifters.”); Leonard E. Daykin, Your Proﬁt May Be in the Customer’s Pocket,
Progressive Grocer, Sept. 1968, at 54, 55, 60 (discussing a survey of 2,000 grocers ﬁnding
that 27.8% always prosecuted, 34% occasionally prosecuted, 27% seldom prosecuted, and
17.2% never prosecuted shoplifters); see also Michael J. Hindelang, Decisions of Shoplifting
Victims to Invoke the Criminal Justice Process, 21 Soc. Probs. 580, 583 tbl.1 (1974) (finding
that the average rate of police referral during the 1960s hovered below 30%).
92. See Delany J. Stinson, Attention Retailers: Civil Law Provides a Tonic, Security
Mgmt., Sept. 1988, at 129, 129.
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demand letters to suspected offenders, followed, when necessary, by suit
in small claims court.93 For some retailers, civil recovery replaced
criminal prosecution, but others sought both remedies simultaneously.94
A 1998 survey found that retailers employed civil recovery around thirty
percent of the time—roughly half the rate at which they sought criminal
prosecution.95 Today, every state has a civil recovery statute. The
authorized recovery is typically $200 to $300 but can exceed $1,000, not
counting attorney fees.96
2. The Persistence of Discretion. — Retailers today remain reluctant to
call the police, often opting instead to exploit their property rights to
sanction suspected thieves.97 But why? Theft, after all, is a classic, blackletter crime—a perfect ﬁt, one might think, for criminal-justice-system
attention. And retailers plainly regard shoplifting as a major trouble.
A few possibilities have been mentioned already, such as fear of suit
for false arrest or of alienating customers.98 Surely, though, these
concerns are diminished by strong merchants’ privilege protections and
improved surveillance capabilities that lower the risk of erroneous
accusations. Store security also have ways to minimize any visible

93. See id. at 131.
94. See Richard C. Hollinger et al., 1998 National Retail Security Survey: Final Report
34 (1998) [hereinafter Hollinger et al., 1998 Survey]; see also Audrey Aronsohn, Teaching
Criminals the Cost of Crime, Security Mgmt., May 1999, at 63, 63 (urging retailers to use
both civil and criminal remedies whenever possible); Ryan P. Sullivan, Survey of State Civil
Shoplifting Statutes (Apr. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2770583 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sullivan, Civil
Shoplifting] (“[M]ost large retailers pursue criminal charges and a civil remedy.”).
95. Hollinger et al., 1998 Survey, supra note 94, at 2–3.
96. Sullivan, Civil Shoplifting, supra note 94, at 4; Bruce Mohl, Retailers’ Message to
Shoplifters: Pay Up or Risk Prosecution, Bos. Globe (Dec. 11, 2005), https://archive.
boston.com/business/articles/2005/12/11/retailers_message_to_shoplifters_pay_up_or_ris
k_prosecution (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
97. See, e.g., Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 14, at 590 (“The private police
department of Macy’s department store, in New York City, . . . reported to the public
police only ﬁfty-six percent of the 1900 people accused of shoplifting that it processed in a
single year through its private detention center.”). Walmart has banned some shoplifters
from all 4,540 of its locations. See Al Norman, Banned from 4,540 Walmarts, HuffPost
(June 26, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-norman/banned-from-4540-walmarts_
b_7147414.html [https://perma.cc/KDM8-4GMB]. In some instances, retailers have
allegedly exceeded their property rights and levied nonrestitutionary ﬁnes, but this
practice appears to have been limited. See, e.g., Brae Canlen, Insecurity Complex, Cal.
Law., June 1998, at 30, 81 (“[S]everal parents and guardians of teenagers who were picked
up for shoplifting [at Disneyland] claimed they were asked to pay a $275 to $500 ﬁne to
avoid criminal prosecution.”).
98. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; see also Alan D. Axelrod &
Thomas Elkind, Note, Merchants’ Responses to Shoplifting: An Empirical Study, 28 Stan. L.
Rev. 589, 589–90 (1976) (describing retailers’ stated reasons for caution, including
“alienation of mistakenly accused customers, the possibility of injury to employees, . . . the
costs of surveillance,” and “fears of civil suits for false arrest and false imprisonment”
(footnotes omitted)).
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disturbance when apprehending suspects.99 Part II explores this question
more deeply. A quick preview here, however, helps identify the problem
that retail justice companies claim to solve.
The starting point is to appreciate the enormity of the challenge
shoplifting presents. The sheer number of incidents in some major
retailers is staggering. In four Florida counties, for example, Walmart
stores—which, for some time, employed a “zero tolerance” policy—
called the police 7,000 times in one year on suspected thefts.100 A single
Walmart store in Tulsa averages over 1,000 calls per year.101 A ﬂow of
cases this large has two principal effects.
First, it strains criminal justice system resources. “It’s hard to
dedicate the manpower to process misdemeanor shoplifters,” explained
one police administrator.102 A “typical theft costs the average police
department over $2,100 to process,” according to one account.103
Response times can be slow.104 Nor is the bottleneck in the police alone:
“There are courts in some of our markets,” reported one major discount
retailer, “that tell us not to bring them our casual shoplifters.”105 Whatever the reason, “[f]or the criminal justice system players, low-level retail
theft often occupies a large percentage of misdemeanor caseloads,
clogging the desks of everyone involved.”106 Not all shoplifting offenses
are misdemeanors, moreover—in some states, the felony threshold
zooms by quickly.107
99. See Robin, supra note 53, at 164.
100. Zachary T. Sampson et al., Walmart: Thousands of Police Calls. You Paid the Bill.,
Tampa Bay Times (May 11, 2016), https://www.tampabay.com/projects/2016/publicsafety/ walmart-police [https://perma.cc/9W5F-2LXP]. Walmart generated fourteen
percent of the Camden, South Carolina, Police Department’s reports in one recent
measure, most of which were for shoplifting. Josh Sanburn, Low Prices, High Crime:
Inside Walmart’s Plan to Crack Down on Shoplifting, Time (Aug. 15, 2016),
http://time.com/4439650/walmart-shoplifting-crime [https://perma.cc/2UTR-LR4G].
101. Shannon Pettypiece & David Voreacos, Walmart’s Out-of-Control Crime Problem Is
Driving Police Crazy, Bloomberg Businessweek (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/
features/2016-walmart-crime (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
102. Emily Gold & Julius Lang, Ctr. for Court Innovation, Diverting Shoplifters: A
Research Report and Planning Guide 5 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Lieutenant Michael Brothers), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/
documents/e11117410_Diverting-Shoplifters-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8BP-5DKZ]; see
also Pettypiece & Voreacos, supra note 101 (quoting a Florida police captain who
explained that “[t]he constant calls from Walmart are just draining” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
103. Gold & Lang, supra note 102, at 4.
104. See Diane Ritchey, Walmart’s ‘Second Chance’ Program for Shoplifters, Security
Mag. (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/87549-walmarts-secondchance-program-for-shoplifters [https://perma.cc/SA2Y-5K46].
105. Gold & Lang, supra note 102, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Randall Ferris, Senior Director of Loss Prevention at SUPERVALU).
106. Id. at 2.
107. See Shteir, supra note 20, at 119 (describing the “enhancement” of state laws to
allow felony charges in more circumstances).
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Second, calling the police in every case taxes retailers as well. “By
involving the public criminal justice system, the [retailer] loses control
over the process, and the costs—both in time and money—to cooperate
with the public police and courts can be signiﬁcant.”108 Retailers are
reluctant to have their employees miss work to meet with the police or
testify in court, for example.109 All the more so because the retailer
receives no direct beneﬁt from the offender’s punishment.
3. The Patterns of Discretion. — In the absence of retail justice, the
fate of many shoplifting suspects is thus determined not by an exercise of
police or prosecutorial discretion but rather by the retailer itself when
deciding whether to alert the public authorities. On what basis do
retailers make these consequential decisions?
Retailers have long employed “no prosecution limits,” contacting
the police only when the stolen goods exceed some minimal value
threshold.110 Even Walmart, which, as noted, famously employed a “zero
tolerance” policy for many years, eventually adopted a dollar-value
cutoff—before contracting with retail justice companies.111 Strict cutoffs
aside, (admittedly dated) research ﬁnds that the value of the suspect’s
take powerfully predicts whether the case goes public.112 The quality of
the evidence matters, too, presumably because retailers are reluctant to
incur the criminal justice system’s costs when conviction is uncertain, and
because they continue to fear liability for wrongful arrest.113
Researchers disagree on whether and how personal characteristics of
the suspect play a role.114 All agree that women and men are referred to

108. Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, supra note 10, at 925.
109. See Gold & Lang, supra note 102, at 4 (discussing the hidden costs of shoplifting
for retailers).
110. See, e.g., Comment, Shoplifting Law: Constitutional Ramiﬁcations of Merchant
Detention Statutes, 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 295, 297 (1973).
111. See Michael Barbaro, Some Leeway for the Small Shoplifter, N.Y. Times (July 13,
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/13/business/13walmart.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting Walmart’s decision to “no longer prosecute ﬁrst-time thieves
unless they are between 18 and 65 and steal merchandise worth at least $25”). In the wake
of the California CEC litigation, Walmart recently removed the retail justice option from
its stores pending review of the company’s theft-reduction programs. See Joe Palazzolo &
Sarah Nassauer, Wal-Mart Suspends Shoplifting Punishment that Court Called “Extortion,”
Wall St. J. (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wal-mart-changes-how-it-punishesshoplifters-1513864840 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
112. Lawrence E. Cohen & Rodney Stark, Discriminatory Labeling and the Five-Finger
Discount: An Empirical Analysis of Different Shoplifting Dispositions, 11 J. Res. Crime &
Delinq. 25, 32 (1974); Melissa G. Davis et al., Private Corporate Justice: Store Police,
Shoplifters, and Civil Recovery, 38 Soc. Probs. 395, 404 (1991); Hindelang, supra note 91,
at 583; Richard J. Lundman, Shoplifting and Police Referral: A Reexamination, 69 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 395, 396 (1978).
113. Cameron, supra note 39, at 34–35; Segrave, supra note 41, at 37.
114. Disparate ﬁndings, of course, may reﬂect underlying variation among retailers.
See, e.g., Dean G. Rojek, Private Justice Systems and Crime Reporting, 17 Criminology
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the police at similar rates.115 Some have found that juveniles are treated
leniently.116 The evidence on race, however, is sharply conﬂicted.117
Class may inﬂuence retailer decisions as well. One of the most recent
academic studies found that poorer suspects are referred to the police
more frequently.118 The motivation, however, may be neither animus
toward the poor nor empathy for the affluent. The study’s authors
conclude, instead, that “[s]tore police skim the affluent for civil recovery
and ship the less affluent to the public criminal justice system.”119
Retailers, in other words, may view civil recovery as the ﬁrst-best
deterrent sanction and resort to criminal justice, a second-best, only
when civil recovery will be ineffectual because the suspect is insolvent. In
this context, criminal law, just as economic analysis prescribes, essentially
functions as tort law for the indigent.120
In fact, in a controlled, experimental setting, with civil recovery out
of the picture, retail security investigators were more likely to refer clean,
well-dressed offenders for prosecution than dirty, poorly dressed ones.121
“In accounting for this,” the study’s authors explain, “investigators
commented that they were more likely to be sympathetic towards a shoplifter who appeared to need what he stole than towards a shoplifter who
100, 109 (1979) (“The frequency of arrests, along with the age and sex of the alleged
offenders were seen to ﬂuctuate with almost wild abandon from store to store.”).
115. See, e.g., Cohen & Stark, supra note 112, at 35; Hindelang, supra note 91, at 583
& tbl.1; Lundman, supra note 112, at 397–98.
116. See, e.g., Hindelang, supra note 91, at 593; Lundman, supra note 112, at 398.
Others ﬁnd no age effects. See, e.g., Cohen & Stark, supra note 112, at 36; Rojek, supra note
114, at 109.
117. Compare Robin, supra note 53, at 169 (ﬁnding that black shoppers were both
disproportionately apprehended and disproportionately referred to the police), and
Cameron, supra note 39, at 136–37 (ﬁnding that arrested black shoppers were
disproportionately prosecuted), with Cohen & Stark, supra note 112, at 34–35 (ﬁnding no
signiﬁcant race effects on referral rates when using “appropriate controls” including age
and the value of the stolen goods), and Hindelang, supra note 91, at 591–92 (ﬁnding no
signiﬁcant race effects on referral rates when controlling for the value of the items stolen).
Two additional papers that shared an author, Professor Richard Lundman, also
conﬂicted—the ﬁrst found a race effect while the second did not. Compare Lundman,
supra note 112, at 397–99 (concluding that the race of the shoplifter has an effect on
referral rates to the police, even when controlling for the value of the items stolen), with
Davis et al., supra note 112, at 406 (ﬁnding no race effects in its sample after attempting
numerous models).
118. See Davis et al., supra note 112, at 406. But cf. Cohen & Stark, supra note 112, at
25 (“Social class is also found to be insigniﬁcantly related to shoplifting dispositions,
except for the high rate of prosecution of the unemployed.”).
119. Davis et al., supra note 112, at 406.
120. See Alon Harel, Economic Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey, in Research
Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law 10, 16 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds.,
2012) (noting that economic analysis leads to the conclusion that “monetary sanctions . . .
ought to be used in cases where the wrongdoer is wealthy, while imprisonment ought to be
used only where monetary sanctions cannot be used due to insolvency of the wrongdoer”).
121. See Andrey Feuerverger & Clifford D. Shearing, An Analysis of the Prosecution of
Shoplifters, 20 Criminology 273, 285 (1982).
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appeared to be quite able to pay for the items involved.”122 Similarly,
customers in a different controlled study reported well-dressed
shoplifters to store personnel twice as often as poorly dressed ones.123
C.

The Rise of Retail Justice

Where many observers saw only a failing system of law enforcement—overtaxed, cumbersome, ineffectual, possibly discriminatory, and
overly harsh toward those snagged in its net—entrepreneurs saw an
opportunity for proﬁt and Pareto improvement. The basic idea can be
simply stated: Retail justice offers private settlement of criminal
complaints. Instead of calling the police, the retailer looks to a retail
justice company, which extracts payment from the alleged offender in
exchange for “rehabilitative education” and a promise not to ﬁle a
criminal complaint. The payment—and possibly the “restorative justice”
course—reduce the likelihood that the suspect will offend in the future,
providing the same (type of) beneﬁt to the victim that public law
enforcement would. The payment and education are nonetheless
preferable, from the suspect’s perspective, to contact with the criminal
justice system. Neither the victim nor the public authorities spend
anything. One leading company touts that the “program enables ﬁrsttime offenders to correct their mistakes and avoid prosecution,” allowing
retailers to “reallocate loss prevention resources” and law enforcement to
“focus their efforts in more effective ways for their individual
communities.”124
Here is how the process works at what appears to be the leading
outﬁt, CEC. CEC is a Utah-based corporation with a national presence,
founded by a pair of Harvard Business School graduates in 2010.125 CEC
has venture-capital backing and reportedly took in $7.6 million in
2017.126 CEC also boasts an impressive client list, which reportedly has

122. Id.
123. Fred Fedler & Bert Pryor, An Equity Theory Explanation of Bystanders’ Reactions
to Shoplifting, 54 Psychol. Rep. 746, 746 (1984). As for what happens after the police
become involved, see Kenneth Adams & Charles R. Cutshall, Refusing to Prosecute Minor
Offenses: The Relative Inﬂuence of Legal and Extralegal Factors, 4 Just. Q. 595, 604–05
(1987) (ﬁnding that race and gender signiﬁcantly predict prosecutorial decisions to
dismiss charges, though prior arrests and number of charged offenses are stronger
predictors).
124. Our Story—Origin of CEC, CEC (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.correctiveeducation.
com/home/blog/our-story-origin-of-cec (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
CEC, Our Story].
125. Leon Neyfakh, Let’s Make a Deal, Slate (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/02/shoplifting_at_whole_foods_or_bloomingdale_s_
pay_corrective_education_company.html [https://perma.cc/PAY2-MA54] [hereinafter
Neyfakh, Make a Deal].
126. See Walmart Class Complaint, supra note 8, at 3; Corrective Education Company
Receives Funding from Decathlon Partners, CEC (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.
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included Walmart, Bloomingdale’s, DSW, Abercrombie & Fitch,
Burlington Coat Factory, Whole Foods, American Apparel, Goodwill
Industries, Sport Chalet, Kroger’s, Sportsman’s Warehouse, and H&M.127
Store management—not CEC personnel—retain responsibility for
monitoring the retail premises and apprehending suspected shoplifters.128 Once apprehended, suspects are brought to a private room and
screened for eligibility, typically including a criminal history check.129
Those who qualify are given the option to watch a CEC video explaining
the company’s “restorative justice” program.130 They are told that, if they
choose not to complete CEC’s program, “CEC will refer this matter back
to the retailer,” which “may pursue other legal rights to seek restitution
and resolve this crime at their discretion.”131 Signing up costs $500, or
$400 for those who pay in one lump sum, with “scholarships” available
for the poorest few.132 No money changes hands when the contract is
signed. Suspects who agree to enroll are free to leave and have seventytwo hours to think it over, consult with a lawyer (if desired), and then pay
a $50 deposit.133 Even after paying the deposit and beginning the
program, suspects can terminate the relationship and receive a partial
refund.134

correctiveeducation.com/home/blog/corrective-education-company-receives-funding-fromdecathlon-partners (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
127. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 34, at 13; Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra
note 125.
128. See Declaration of Darrell Huntsman in Support of Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2, People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Educ. Co., No. CGC-15-549094
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Huntsman Declaration] (“CEC does not
apprehend suspected shoplifters, [and] does not determine who is apprehended . . . .”);
Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125.
129. See Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, at 2–3 (“In order to qualify for CEC’s
education program, a determination is typically made as to whether or not the individual
has an existing criminal record.”); see also Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125 (noting
offenders are eligible when they have “been deemed signiﬁcantly low-risk, based on their
criminal history, by the store security guard who apprehended them”); CEC, supra note 2
(“CEC Connect™ qualiﬁes offenders through a database of 50 billion records and meets
the most rigorous security and privacy standards.”).
130. Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, at 3–4 (detailing that “once a retailer
determines that an individual should be offered CEC’s program, the retailer’s security
personnel” offers the option to watch a video explaining the program).
131. Id. at 4.
132. See id. at 5–6 (asserting that CEC “offers the program at a discount to more than
3–4% of course takers,” and that “the average ﬁnancial assistance discount is . . . at least
half the total course fee”); Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125 (“The company accepts
credit cards, e-checks, and money orders, and while they offer a ‘scholarship’ program for
people below the poverty line, . . . about 85 percent of offenders pay the full fee, and less
than 2 percent qualify for a free ride.”).
133. Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, at 4–5, exh. C, at 1–2, 4.
134. Id. exh. C, at 2.
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For years, suspects who enrolled also signed a “Criminal
Compromise Agreement” and admitted guilt.135 Today, the contract is
styled as a “Restorative Justice Agreement” and no confession is
required.136 The agreement states that, if the suspect completes the program successfully, the retailer “will consider the matter closed for all
purposes.”137 In particular, the retailer promises not to “pursue the
matter with law enforcement” or seek civil recovery.138 The contract cautions, though, that “law enforcement is not bound by this agreement”
and covenants that, if the suspect is prosecuted notwithstanding
successful completion of CEC’s program, CEC will refund all fees
collected.139
More than ninety percent of the individuals presented with the
choice during CEC’s ﬁrst four years opted to enroll, generating approximately 20,000 participants. An enrollee’s ﬁrst actual contact with CEC is
typically a call from a “life coach” who reaches out to “tell them about
the course and make a payment plan.”140 The core of CEC’s course,
which most “students” take online over six to eight hours, was developed
by a clinical psychologist and adapted by CEC “for the purpose of
rehabilitating shoplifters.”141 It “focuses on helping accused shoplifters
develop life skills, so that they are less likely to reoffend in the future.”142
On CEC’s own account:
There’s a chapter that helps them understand what could have
happened if they’d gone through the traditional process. But
after that, we [CEC] give them skills and the ability to actually
go out and get a job . . . . These people that are getting
apprehended typically haven’t been taught the life principles of
how to build a resume, how to be presentable in an interview.
They haven’t been given the skills to understand what a budget
is, never mind how to manage their money. So as they’re going
through the course, they build their own resume, they build
their own budget, a work-out plan, an eating plan.143
The retailer, for its part, saves time processing suspects, says CEC.
“Studies have proven a 40% reduction in processing time when using
CEC’s platform,” the company claims.144 Initially, the retailer also
collected a cut of CEC’s fee, around $40, each time it presented a suspect
135. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 34, at 18–19.
136. Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, at 7, exh. C, at 15; see also Telephone
Interview with Brian Ashton, CEO, CEC (Dec. 4, 2017).
137. Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, exh. C, at 3.
138. Id. exh. A, at 2.
139. Id. exh. C, at 3.
140. Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting E.J. Caffaro, CEC’s vice
president for account management).
144. CEC, supra note 2.
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who enrolled.145 CEC charges the retailer nothing for its services, which it
touts as being “completely offender funded.”146 “Law enforcement
agencies have also noticed our impact,” CEC maintains, “seeing as much
as a 40 percent drop in the number of calls for service in their
communities.”147 Journalists have found even larger effects.148
CEC proudly advertises success in battling recidivism, claiming that
it “reduces the likelihood that a shoplifter will come back to the store to
steal again.”149 “Less than 2% of shoplifters who complete the CEC
educational program reoffend” at one of CEC’s retailers, “compared with
estimates as high as 80% for those who do not participate in a restorative
justice program.”150 “CEC’s educational programs not only addresses
[sic] behavioral issues, but provide life skills and motivation for
reintegration,” the company’s website explains.151 CEC is “continually
reforming generations and changing lives, one day at a time,” it adds.152
Indeed, CEC even offers testimonials from “graduates” who claim the
program helped them “create new values, attitudes, and goals” and
“achieve self-responsibility and self-worth.”153
Contracting with CEC commits retailers to sorting cases according to
predetermined characteristics, without any on-the-scene discretion. CEC
145. Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125. CEC has reportedly ended this practice.
See Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, at 5–6.
146. Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting an earlier version of the CEC website). CEC’s business model may have changed
slightly since Neyfakh reported on it. See CEC, supra note 2 (“CEC’s program is offender
funded. The technology, database and professional services are all provided at little or no
cost to the retailer.”).
147. CEC, Our Story, supra note 124; see also Arlington Police’s Walmart Restorative
Justice Initiative Results in Three International Awards, Arlington Police Dep’t (Oct. 24,
2017), http://www.arlington-tx.gov/news/2017/10/24/arlington-polices-walmart-restorativejustice-initiative-results-3-international-awards [https://perma.cc/7UZ2-KR6A] (describing a
Walmart Restorative Justice Initiative with CEC resulting in “more than a 50 percent
reduction in theft calls for service and overall arrests”); Natalie Crofts, 1st Time Shoplifters
Can Keep Clean Record with Help of Utah Company, KSL.com (Sept. 20, 2014), https://
www.ksl.com/index.php?nid=148&sid=31774717 [https://perma.cc/5XA6-QB5A] (quoting
supportive commentary from a Salt Lake City Police Department property crime
detective).
148. See, e.g., Deborah Knapp, Walmart Cracks Down on Shoplifting by Taking Justice
into Its Own Hands, KENS5 (San Antonio) (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.kens5.com/
features/walmart-cracks-down-on-shoplifting-by-taking-justice-into-its-own-hands/351317792
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting, based on a review of police records,
drops of 33%, 49%, 56%, and 72% in shoplifting at four Texas Walmart stores).
149. Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125.
150. Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note 136; Statement of Corrective
Education Company, CEC (June 8, 2016), https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/
blog/statement-of-corrective-education-company (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter CEC, Statement].
151. CEC, supra note 2.
152. Id.
153. Id. (testimonial of Eleanor, a CEC program participant).
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permits retailers to set eligibility criteria including criminal history, age,
and item value, but excluding race, gender, language ability, or related
characteristics.154 Suspects who are too young or too old,155 and those
whose thefts are too small, may be released, for example, while suspects
who steal big-ticket items may be referred to the police. Fewer than one
in ten CEC students is a juvenile.156 Retailers set these criteria at the
corporate level and embed them in a “black box”; the security guard
simply enters basic information into a computer application and is
instructed how to proceed.157
There is less public information about CEC’s competitors, like
Turning Point Justice (TPJ), though enough to discern that the basic
model seems similar.158 TPJ was founded in 2012 by a former district
attorney from Salt Lake County, Utah, who had worked at CEC.159 In an
apparent effort to distinguish itself from CEC, TPJ touts a “restorative
justice” program developed by the National Association of Shoplifting
Prevention and used by courts—as part of postarrest diversion
programs—for over twenty years.160 Suspects pay $400 to $425 to enroll
with TPJ, roughly $50 to $75 of which is designated “restitution” and sent
to the retailer.161
II. EVALUATING RETAIL JUSTICE
This Part pivots from description to evaluation. Sections II.A
through II.C examine whether retail justice seems likely to harm
154. Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, at 2–3; Telephone Interview with Brian
Ashton, supra note 136.
155. CEC uses a different “restorative justice” course for juveniles whom the retailer’s
criteria do not exclude. See Corrective Education Company Announces Exclusive
Partnership with D.A.R.E. at National Retail Federation Convention, CEC (June 29, 2015),
https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/blog/corrective-education-company-announcesexclusive-partnership-with-dare-at-national-retail-federation-convention (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review). The juvenile contract is different as well. See Huntsman
Declaration, supra note 128, exh. C, at 6.
156. Email from Brian Ashton, CEO, CEC, to author (Jan. 15, 2018) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
157. Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note 136.
158. See Retailers, Turning Point Justice, http://turningpointjustice.com/Retailers
[https://perma.cc/V6H4-XDUD] [hereinafter Turning Point Justice, Retailers] (last
visited Aug. 10, 2018) (detailing TPJ’s business model, including the restitutionary
payments that are collected by retailers).
159. Palazzolo & Nassauer, supra note 111; Leadership Team, Turning Point Justice,
http://turningpointjustice.com/Leadership-Team [https://perma.cc/JHM6-UWJN] (last
visited Aug. 10, 2018).
160. Turning Point Justice, Retailers, supra note 158.
161. Palazzolo & Nassauer, supra note 111. The precise amount of “restitution” is
calculated by reference to the pertinent civil recovery statute. TPJ claims that retailers
commonly donate this money to charity or to an “indigence fund” that covers program
costs for suspected shoplifters who cannot afford the fees themselves. Telephone Interview
with Paul Stewart, COO, Turning Point Justice (Feb. 9, 2018).
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suspects, victims, or the broader public, respectively. Throughout, retail
justice is compared to the real criminal justice system, warts and all,
though potentially signiﬁcant jurisdictional variation is necessarily (and
unfortunately) obscured.162 Section II.D then explains why leading
theories for prohibiting blackmail do not justify a ban on retail justice.
A note on structure: There is no intellectual consensus on why
blackmail is illegal. Myriad competing theories emphasize disparate
values and interests. Accordingly, rather than address the blackmail
question at the outset, the normative issues are taken up in their most
natural order. This discussion nearly resolves the blackmail problem,
leaving only a few loose ends to tie up in section II.D.
A.

Are Suspects Worse Off?

Retail justice companies, critics argue, prey on vulnerable
consumers, wielding the threat of criminal prosecution to extract
confessions and hefty enrollment fees. The proﬁt motive, moreover,
creates incentives for overzealous enforcement, the brunt of which
disfavored groups or, worse yet, the innocent, will bear.163 Indeed, the
City of San Francisco asserted the interests of its residents when it sued
CEC in 2015, seeking to halt its operation.164 And the trial court recently
accepted the city’s argument.165 But are shoplifting suspects really better
off without the retail justice alternative?

162. Even if retail justice is normatively preferable to criminal justice in many settings,
there may be jurisdictions in which criminal justice is so lenient as to undermine this
conclusion, or so draconian that it cannot form a morally appropriate baseline for
comparative analysis. Cf. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Philosophy, Science, and Method
440, 450–51 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (“[W]hen the normal and morally
expected courses of events diverge, the one of these which is to be used in deciding
whether a conditional announcement of an action constitutes a threat or an offer is the
course of events that the recipient of the action prefers.”). But see Oren Bar-Gill & Omri
Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 717, 729–30 (2005) [hereinafter Bar-Gill &
Ben-Shahar, Coercion] (arguing that, even when the baseline itself is morally intolerable,
precluding the choice of an alternative disserves the threatened party’s interests).
163. See, e.g., Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125 (reporting that all four public
defenders interviewed were “pretty appalled” by CEC’s business model). Susannah
Karlsson, a Brooklyn Defender Services attorney, said with regard to CEC that “[t]here’s
no judicial oversight, there are no constitutional protections, there’s no due process.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Steven Wasserman of the Legal Aid Society’s Criminal
Practice Special Litigation unit remarked that “it sounded like CEC was ‘ﬂirting with the
crime of coercion in the second degree.’” Id.; see also Lorelei Laird, Retail Justice: Are
Private Education Programs for Shoplifters a Second Chance—or Extortion?, A.B.A. J.,
June 2016, at 18, 18 (reporting that “some observers are skeptical,” worrying that “the
programs . . . could ensnare innocent people without due process”).
164. See S.F. Complaint, supra note 6, at 8–16.
165. People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Educ. Co., No. CGC-15-549094, slip op. at 3
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2017) (holding that the “undisputed facts . . . establish that CEC’s
diversion program runs afoul of California’s extortion laws”).
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This section begins to work through this question in three stages:
First, is retail justice a “bad deal” for suspects in an economic sense, such
that we should reject the standard assumption that, because suspects
choose it, it makes them better off? Second, even if retail justice makes
suspects better off in general, does it disadvantage particular groups of
suspects, such as the poor or people of color? Third, does the retail
justice model encourage overenforcement of shoplifting laws, potentially
even ensnaring suspects who are legally or normatively innocent?
1. Economic Efficiency: Is Retail Justice a “Bad Deal” for Suspects? — The
“standard Pareto argument,” applied here, is that retail justice “improves
the situation” of the suspects who choose it.166 The agreement suspects
sign to enroll with CEC, for example, is formally an offer to contract,
which suspects are (at least ostensibly) free to reject. Sure enough, in
marketing their services, retail justice companies emphasize how they
help offenders by sheltering them from the criminal justice system and
extending to them the proverbial “second chance.”167
The standard Pareto argument fails, however, when the conditions
for efficient contracting are lacking.168 Four possibilities are considered
here. The ﬁrst three correspond loosely to contract law’s concepts of
undue inﬂuence, misrepresentation, and mistake of fact. The last
entertains the notion that, even if retail justice beneﬁts suspects
individually, it harms them as a class by exploiting a collective action
problem among them. Perhaps surprisingly given the demographic data
reported above, fewer than ten percent of the “students” at one major
retail justice company are juveniles.169 The following analysis therefore
assumes an adult suspect, remaining agnostic on the potentially quite
different juvenile case.
a. Undue Inﬂuence. — “Free consent is . . . a predicate condition of
presuming mutually valuable exchange.”170 To many observers, this is the
principal problem with retail justice: Suspects pay the retail justice
companies’ fees only under serious pressure from the threat of arrest and
criminal prosecution. There is truth to this critique; shoplifting suspects
face an unenviable dilemma. It does not follow, however, that they are

166. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Plea Bargain, supra note 30, at 738.
167. See, e.g., Fight Shoplifting, Grow Restitution, Integrity and Trust, Turning Point
Justice, http://www.turningpointjustice.com/News-Releases-Fp_article-D7 [https://perma.cc/
D56V-Y5XP] (last visited Aug. 17, 2018) (asserting that retailers that use TPJ’s service “save
their communities millions, and provide a second chance for petit theft offenders”); CEC,
supra note 2 (listing “Second Chances: Good people can make bad decisions” as a
justiﬁcation for the program).
168. Cf. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J.
1909, 1940–49 (1992) (identifying circumstances in which “the assumption of efficient
contracting” fails in the plea bargaining context).
169. See Email from Brian Ashton to author, supra note 156.
170. Alan Devlin, Fundamental Principles of Law and Economics 186 (2015).
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worse off for being offered the choice or that retail justice companies
should be prohibited from offering it to them.
“Even highly coercive threats are present in many types of legitimate
economic bargaining.”171 Duress is unlawful, but true duress occurs only
when the “offeror” “manufactures a false choice for the offeree”: “your
money or your life.”172 Retailers, though, are perfectly free to call the
police on suspected shoplifters. The choice is not “false” in the relevant
sense. The ultimate source of pressure on a suspect is neither the retailer
nor the retail justice company but rather the erratic and draconian
criminal justice system the suspect is desperate to avoid.173
Yet unlawful coercion is not limited to duress alone. When circumstances suggest that the pressured party acted under the domination of
another and that his assent “does not reﬂect his preference” or is
“contrary to self-interest,” the law may ﬁnd that “undue inﬂuence” taints
the deal.174 This does not seem to describe the basic retail justice
landscape, however.
Consider the choice from the perspective of a typical guilty suspect.
The suspect must weigh the cost of enrolling with a retail justice
company and completing the required course, on the one hand, against
the expected consequences of contact with the criminal justice system
(and civil recovery), on the other. Arrest is not guaranteed—one recent
ﬁgure pegs the arrest rate for shoplifting nationwide at ﬁfty percent175—
and charges may never be ﬁled. But consequences for the unlucky ﬁfty
percent include a full search of the suspect’s person and belongings,176

171. James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 670,
701 & n.162 (1984) [hereinafter Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox]; see also Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1935, 1950 n.32 (1993)
[hereinafter Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice] (“That the blackmailee may be faced
with a hard choice . . . does not necessarily make the blackmail any more coercive than the
choice facing many parties to wholly legitimate economic transactions.”).
172. Devlin, supra note 170, at 187.
173. The question of false choice reappears infra section II.A.1.d in the discussion of
suspects’ collective action problem. Some additional objections are dealt with there.
174. Devlin, supra note 170, at 186; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177
cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (directing attention to the “unfairness of the resulting
bargain” in assessing whether an agreement resulted from “unfair persuasion”); Bar-Gill &
Ben-Shahar, Coercion, supra note 162, at 744–46 (discussing a “substantive justice”
approach to coercion that “focuses on the substantive fairness of the interaction” and
“views a threat as coercive if it results in a one-sided transaction”).
175. Shoplifting Statistics, supra note 23.
176. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221–24 (1973).
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along with the physical danger177 and collateral consequences of arrest178
and preventive detention179 (even if she is never prosecuted180); a
dizzying array of costs and fees (even if she is indigent);181 and the
177. See, e.g., Andrea M. Burch, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Arrest-Related Deaths 2003–2009, at 1, 4 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ard0309st.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/5QJ7-WRZ9] (estimating 700 arrest-related deaths
annually); Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Death in Custody: Arrest-Related, Open Justice, http://
openjustice.doj.ca.gov/death-in-custody/arrest-related [https://perma.cc/CU8Y-ZKYJ] (last
visited Aug. 10, 2018) (reporting that twenty percent of all deaths in custody are arrestrelated). Sandra Bland’s death is, for many, most salient. See Leon Neyfakh, Why Was Sandra
Bland Still in Jail?, Slate (July 23, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/ crime/ 2015/ 07/ sandra_bland_is_the_bail_system_that_kept_her_in_prison_
unconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/5E7E-GBXP]. Disease is also a concern. See, e.g.,
Joseph A. Bick, Infection Control in Jails and Prisons, 45 Clinical Infectious Diseases 1047,
1047 (2007) (describing the “increased risk” of disease acquisition in carceral institutions).
178. See, e.g., Jeff Grogger, Arrests, Persistent Youth Joblessness, and Black/White
Employment Differentials, 74 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 100, 105–06 (1992) (ﬁnding that arrests
help explain persistent nonemployment and the black/white employment gap); Rachel A.
Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 313–15 (2016) (“Arrestees lose income
during the arrest, and sometimes their jobs . . . . An arrest can affect child custody rights, . . .
trigger deportation, and . . . get a suspect kicked out of public housing . . . . [I]ndividuals
with arrest records may have worse employment and financial prospects . . . even if the
arrestee is never convicted of a crime.” (footnotes omitted)); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation,
67 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 810–12 (2015) (describing how “immigration enforcement officials, public
housing authorities, public benefits administrators, employers, licensing authorities, social
services providers, and education officials, among others” use arrest information adversely
against arrestees).
179. See, e.g., Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction,
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 Am.
Econ. Rev. 201, 201 (2018) (ﬁnding that “pretrial detention signiﬁcantly increases the
probability of conviction . . . [and] decreases formal sector employment and the receipt of
employment- and tax-related government beneﬁts”); Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. Times
Mag. (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing a defendant who “lost three weeks of
income, was subjected to brutal physical violence and missed Thanksgiving dinner with his
family” before his charges were dismissed for lack of evidence); Cal. Dep’t of Justice,
Death in Custody: Booking & Pre-Trial, Open Justice, https://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/
death-in-custody/pretrial [https://perma.cc/T5QT-P5JS] (last visited Aug. 10, 2018)
(reporting that ﬁfteen percent of all deaths in custody occurred among detainees awaiting
arraignment or trial).
Pretrial detention can be lengthy even on minor charges. See, e.g., Steven B. Bright &
Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Deﬁance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 Yale
L.J. 2150, 2162 (2013) (“A woman in Mississippi charged with shoplifting spent eleven
months in jail before a lawyer was appointed to her case, and three additional months
before entering a guilty plea.”).
180. See James B. Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record 201 (2015) (“It is standard
practice for an arrest to remain on the rap sheet even if the case is dismissed, adjourned in
contemplation of dismissal, or resolved by a not guilty verdict.”).
181. For comprehensive taxonomies, see Appleman, supra note 16, at 1485
(describing “[p]rivate probation, bail fees, translation fees, indigent representation fees,
dismissal fees, high interest rates, jail and prison costs, court ﬁnes, and community service
charges”); Logan & Wright, supra note 16, at 1185–96 (detailing various legal ﬁnancial
obligations that criminal suspects and defendants incur at each stage of the criminal
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possibility of conviction and punishment (ranging from days to years in
prison and hefty ﬁnes),182 with additional collateral consequences.183
It would be perfectly rational for self-interested suspects to prefer
the retail justice option. All the more so if they are risk averse and thus
beneﬁt from the certainty retail justice provides. In fact, it would be
similarly rational, if tragic, for innocent suspects as well. While the
probability of prosecution and conviction should be lower for an
innocent suspect, they are not negligible,184 and the consequences of
arrest are just the same as for the guilty in most jurisdictions. Indeed, we
have understood since Professor Malcolm Feeley’s famous tome that, for
many accused misdemeanants, “the process is the punishment.”185
Note that, despite the foregoing analysis, this conclusion does not
necessarily depend on ﬁne empirical judgments about the cost of
enrollment or the likelihood of arrest or prosecution in the absence of
retail justice. On one leading account of coercion, a proposal is coercive
only if it threatens to make its recipients worse off than they would have
been in the “morally expected course of events.”186 Yet the maximal
justice process); see also Konig, supra note 20 (reporting court and legal fees for
shoplifting cases in the hundreds or thousands of dollars). See generally Alexes Harris, A
Pound of Flesh (2016) (arguing that the use of monetary sanctions as a criminal
sentencing tool in the United States allows courts to control individuals until they fully pay
their debts, which reinforces existing inequalities).
182. See, e.g., Ryan P. Sullivan et al., Stolen Proﬁts: Civil Shoplifting Demands and the
Misuse of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,194, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 28, 32 (2016) (reporting that
shoplifting a $10 item in Florida could result in sixty days in jail and $500 in ﬁnes and fees,
while shoplifting a candy bar in Nebraska could result in a six-month jail sentence and
$1,000 in ﬁnes). For thefts of costlier items, substantially larger penalties may obtain. See,
e.g., Va. Code § 18.2-95 (2018) (authorizing grand larceny sentences of up to twenty
years); id. § 18.2-103 (deﬁning theft of $500 or more as grand larceny).
183. See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 23–34 (2013) (cataloging consequences of
misdemeanor convictions, including “loss of the right to possess a ﬁrearm, to serve in the
military, . . . to receive . . . public beneﬁts, to drive a car legally, and to adopt a child”);
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Deﬁning Effective Advocacy in Lower Courts,
45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 277, 298–99 (2011) (explaining that some misdemeanor convictions
can trigger deportation, loss of student-loan assistance, or eviction from public housing);
see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 & n.11 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the
result) (listing the possible results of misdemeanor convictions, including social stigma,
forfeiture of public office, disqualiﬁcation from a licensed profession, and loss of pension
rights).
184. On the risks of wrongful conviction for misdemeanor defendants, see Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313, 1316, 1328–50 (2012) (describing the
criminal justice system’s “high tolerance for wrongful petty convictions”).
185. Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower
Criminal Court (1979); see also Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, supra note 32, at 1132–
39 (describing how an innocent defendant’s experience with the criminal justice system
may be punishment itself).
186. Nozick, supra note 162, at 450; see also Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Coercion, supra
note 162, at 740–44 (discussing “rights-based theories of coercion,” which posit that “[i]f B
has a right to be free from situation X, then h[er] agreement to do Y in order to be freed
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threat retailers (acting through retail justice companies) could make is to
call the police on everyone who declined to enroll. This would entail no
rights violation, however, and no threat to make suspects worse off than
they are morally entitled to be. Shoplifting suspects have no moral
entitlement to a particular probability of arrest or prosecution and no
moral complaint if retailers were to pursue charges in every case.187 This
also means that not until the price of “tuition” exceeded the cost of
actual criminal justice sanctions could we infer that retail justice
“students”—most of whom we would expect to reject the offer at this
price—were getting a raw deal.
Notice that the criminal justice system’s severity is the fertile soil that
nourishes the retail justice alternative. Public choice theory predicts as
much. As Professor Keith Hylton has explained in a related context, “[a]
system of harsh punishments encourages rent-seeking—for example,
bribe-taking—on the part of law enforcement officials.”188 “As the
harshness of penalties increases,” Hylton continues, “law enforcement
agents have greater leverage with which to seek bribes, which can be
demanded of the guilty and the innocent alike.”189 Hylton is writing
about public law enforcement agents, but private agents—with the power
to stave off the public ones—can extract these rents as well.
b. Misrepresentation. — Retail justice companies boast about the
transformational power of their “restorative justice” programs—which,
they say, drive down recidivism—even posting testimonials from
“students” describing their reformations.190 These claims register as
naïve, if not disingenuous. The pertinent “student” population, recall,
has been cleansed of most repeat offenders. Multiple studies have
found that shoplifters seldom reoffend after their first apprehension,191
from the threat of having X inﬂicted on her must result from, or, it is the deﬁnition of,
coercion”).
187. Cf. Nozick, supra note 162, at 452–53 (assuming that the police are “morally
expected” to prosecute individuals they believe they can prove committed crimes).
188. Keith N. Hylton, Whom Should We Punish, and How? Rational Incentives and
Criminal Justice Reform, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2513, 2526 (2018) [hereinafter Hylton,
Whom Should We Punish].
189. Id. at 2527.
190. See, e.g., CEC, Statement, supra note 150.
191. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 39, at 151 (“Among pilferers who are
apprehended and interrogated by the store police but set free without formal charge,
there is very little or no recidivism.” (emphasis omitted)); Cohen & Stark, supra note 112,
at 30 (“[V]irtually no one continues shoplifting after being apprehended once . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)); Admit Your Guilt, Serve No Time, Progressive Grocer, Nov. 1991, at
8, 8 (ﬁnding that only ﬁve percent of individuals who were apprehended for shoplifting
and paid civil damages were later reapprehended). Klemke argues that “there are serious
under-reporting biases in these studies.” Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37,
at 125; see also Lloyd W. Klemke, Does Apprehension for Shoplifting Amplify or
Terminate Shoplifting Behavior?, 12 Law & Soc’y Rev. 391, 396 & tbl.1 (1978) [hereinafter
Klemke, Apprehension for Shoplifting] (ﬁnding, using a self-report methodology, that
forty percent of youths shoplifted again after having been apprehended). Of course, the
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suggesting the baseline rate of recidivism may be low. Of those who do
steal again, most will escape detection.192 Estimates of recidivism based
on subsequent apprehension will therefore understate the true rate,
potentially severely.193
To be sure, some CEC “students” are probably more serious criminals who have managed to keep their records clean. But the evidence
suggests that rehabilitating this population is an enormous challenge.194
An eight-hour online course is no brace against the deep-seated personal
and structural forces that precipitate serious criminality.195 Nor, for what
it’s worth, does CEC’s course appear to incorporate even the most basic
elements of the “restorative justice” movement in whose ﬂag it is
wrapped.196 All this raises the possibility that retail justice companies
misrepresent the beneﬁts they deliver in exchange for the fees they
collect. If any such misrepresentation is inducing suspects to enroll, the

same underreporting biases likely infect the retail justice companies’ recidivism ﬁgures as
well.
192. See Shoplifting Statistics, supra note 23 (“Shoplifters . . . are caught an average of
only once in every 48 times they steal.”).
193. A fortiori if recidivism ﬁgures are based on subsequent arrest by the public
police, as at least one CEC study appears to have been. See Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra
note 125 (“When the company presented a law enforcement agency in Florida with a list
of several hundred people in their jurisdiction who had completed the CEC course during
the previous two years, they were told that less than 1 percent of the sample had since
been arrested for any crime . . . .”).
194. See, e.g., Bruce Western, The Rehabilitation Paradox, New Yorker (May 9, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-rehabilitation-paradox [https://perma.cc/
D6Y4-6963] (“Rehabilitative programs are often too little, too late; we need to intercede
early.”).
195. See, e.g., Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime:
Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 155, 183
(2004); Steven Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment
on Crime, 44 J.L. & Econ. 259, 262 (2001); John Paul Wright et al., Association of Prenatal
and Childhood Blood Lead Concentrations with Criminal Arrests in Early Adulthood, 5
PLoS Med. 732, 732 (2008).
196. One expert commented, for example, that retail justice “does not sound like a
model for restorative justice.” Laird, supra note 163, at 19 (citing Professor Mary Louise
Frampton); see also, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation 11
(2002) (deﬁning restorative justice as “a process whereby all the parties [the victim,
offender, and affected community] with a stake in a particular offence come together to
resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for
the future” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tony Marshall)); Stephen P.
Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 303, 303
(listing “victim-offender mediation, family group conference, and sentencing circles” as
“the processes associated with restorative justice”). Although “restorative justice theory
uniformly endorses[] restitution as the primary remedial response to criminal acts[,] [t]he
speciﬁc amount and form of this restitution is usually agreed upon by both the victim and
the offender through some form of mediation process.” Garvey, supra, at 307.
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Pareto assumption (that enrollment beneﬁts suspects) may be
misplaced.197
It seems doubtful, however, that this is actually the case. More likely,
the retail justice companies’ claims about recidivism are immaterial to
suspects’ decisions to enroll. Reliance is likely lacking. Indeed, in
attacking CEC’s business model, San Francisco alleges that people pay
CEC’s fees for no other reason than to avoid contact with the criminal
justice system.198 That hardly suggests suspects are being hoodwinked—
quite the contrary. If suspects do not expect anything of value from the
course—and would pay the fees even if no course were offered, for
instance—then the retail justice companies defraud them of nothing if
the course turns out to be worthless.
It is worth acknowledging that an emerging literature ﬁnds that
training in “noncognitive” skills may generate large reductions in crime
under certain conditions.199 It’s not clear from available evidence that
CEC’s courses incorporate this know-how. But it does raise the possibility
that some forms of short-term “education” could have crime-reducing
effects—a public good with positive externalities. We would expect the
market to undersupply a good like this, making the normative question
whether the state ought to provide a subsidy.
c. Mistake. — A third potential “market failure” that could
undermine the efficient-contracting assumption stems from asymmetric
information. Maybe suspects choose retail justice, the argument goes,
because they harbor misconceptions—which the retail justice companies
exploit, or even foster—about their expected sanctions in the criminal
justice system, particularly as ﬁrst-time offenders.200 Worse yet, some
critics argue, retail justice companies afford none of the procedural
rights criminal defendants enjoy—in particular, no judicial oversight and
no assistance from counsel who might help them assess their odds before
paying to enroll.201 If suspects understood the prosecutor was unlikely to
197. See Devlin, supra note 170, at 188 (discussing how information asymmetries
caused by misrepresentation can lead to inefficient outcomes).
198. See S.F. Complaint, supra note 6, at 10.
199. See, e.g., Christopher Blattman et al., Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental
Evidence from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Liberia, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 1165, 1182–
204 (2017); Sara B. Heller et al., Thinking, Fast and Slow? Some Field Experiments to
Reduce Crime and Dropout in Chicago, 132 Q.J. Econ. 1, 32–38 (2016).
200. A court may be reluctant to allocate the risk of mistake to suspects given the
circumstances in which their agreement is sought, cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 154 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (explaining the circumstances under which a contracting party
may bear the risk of mistake), creating the possibility that the resulting contract is voidable
by the suspect, cf. id. § 153 (stating that, under certain circumstances, a contract may be
voidable by a mistaken party who does not bear the risk of mistake).
201. See, e.g., Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125; cf. Brown, Blackmail as Private
Justice, supra note 171, at 1972 (arguing that public enforcement of the law might be a
necessary condition to balance the individual’s interest in procedural protection with the
public’s interest in the enforcement of substantive norms).
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pursue charges, for instance, they would have little reason to pay the fee.
Indeed, San Francisco’s legal theory hinges partly on the purported
leniency of its criminal justice system, which, it says, belies the
threatening messages CEC delivers to shoplifting suspects.202 (CEC
appears to have tempered its messaging since the lawsuit was ﬁled, now
saying less about what suspects can expect if they decline to enroll.203)
This argument suggests an important limit on the circumstances in
which retail justice can be assumed beneﬁcial based on suspect choice.
The more retail justice companies exploit the misapprehensions of their
“students” about the criminal justice system, the better the case for
regulating their activity. The risk may be highest where local justice is
most lenient, suggesting, among other things, that retail justice
companies might wish to tailor their messaging to local legal context.
The point should not be overstated, however. Even factoring in the
possibility of diversion, nonprosecution, and other channels of mercy,
criminal justice system contact in most jurisdictions is something to be
feared and avoided at virtually any cost. An arrest alone can be
devastating, even in San Francisco.204
As for procedural protections, we ought not to lionize this aspect of
the criminal process either. Most misdemeanor prosecutions, argues
Professor Alexandra Natapoff in her searing exposé, “baldly contradict
the standard due process model of criminal adjudication,” lacking “the
evidentiary and procedural protections that are supposed to ensure the
guilt of the accused.”205 Perhaps most shockingly, there is “compelling
evidence that . . . petty offenders in particular[] often do not get counsel
even when they are legally entitled to it.”206 Those who do get an attorney may
receive only a few minutes of consultation before entering a plea.207
202. See S.F. Complaint, supra note 6, at 1. Note that risk-averse suspects may prefer
retail justice even when its expected sanctions are slightly higher, if contact with the
criminal justice system brings more uncertainty.
203. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 34, at 16–17.
204. On the consequences of arrest generally, see supra notes 178, 180, 185.
Regarding San Francisco speciﬁcally, a pending class action lawsuit alleges that the city’s
implementation of its bail schedule effects an unconstitutional wealth-based detention
scheme. One of the lead plaintiffs, Riana Buffin, was allegedly arrested for theft from a
department store and, unable to pay her $30,000 bail, held for forty-six hours before the
prosecutor decided not to ﬁle charges, causing her to lose her job at the Oakland airport.
See Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 6–7, Buffin v. City of San Francisco, No. 15CV-4959 (N.D. Cal. ﬁled May 27, 2016), 2016 WL 3587128.
205. Natapoff, supra note 184, at 1315–16.
206. Id. at 1341 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1340–42. The constitutional rule,
evidently honored in the breach, mandates counsel whenever incarceration is imposed.
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).
207. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 184, at 1342–43 (describing misdemeanor
representation as often “a formality,” “better described as facilitating the guilty plea rather
than checking the merits of the case”); Lisa C. Wood et al., Meet-and-Plead: The Inevitable
Consequence of Crushing Defender Workloads, 42 Litig. 20, 23 (2016) (asserting that
“attorneys engage in meet-and-plead dispositions in courtrooms across the country”).
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Judicial oversight is scarce.208 Yet the collateral consequences of
conviction attach just the same.209 It may well be that more people
underestimate than overestimate the criminal justice system’s horrors.210
d. Collective Action / Externalities. — Finally, it may be that, while any
particular suspect, viewed in isolation, beneﬁts from an expanded choice
set, the class of suspects as a whole is actually harmed. That is, retail justice companies may appear to help suspected shoplifters only by
exploiting a collective action problem that prevents them from banding
together in resistance. Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar
have modeled the point in the plea bargaining context.211 The basic
intuition is that, if all defendants could agree to insist on trial, they would
overwhelm the criminal justice system and prosecutors would be forced
to forgo prosecution in many cases.212 As Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar note,
“Plea bargains are contracts with externalities: each defendant who accepts a plea frees prosecutorial resources to pursue other defendants.”213
In fact, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s argument may in some ways be
stronger in this context than in its original setting. Bar-Gill and BenShahar rightly acknowledge, in the plea bargaining context, that prosecutors’ budgets are endogenous and may increase if plea bargaining were
abolished, allowing prosecutors to pursue more cases.214 In the context of
retail theft, we can actually observe the counterfactual—the world
without retail justice. We know that, in the absence of retail justice, retailers and prosecutors in fact have declined to prosecute many suspects.215
At the same time, the arrest rate in this counterfactual world is still
fairly high—ﬁfty percent216—and retailers can seek civil recovery as well.
And the threat of even more arrests and civil recovery—if suspects were
208. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1071, 1138 (2017) (lamenting “wrongful and pressured convictions by plea
agreements without any judicial oversight”); Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police,
104 Geo. L.J. 745, 747–48 (2016) (“Reams of scholarship look at the lack of judicial
oversight at every stage of the process, from plea bargains to sentencing decisions, and
waivers that make pleas virtually unreviewable by appellate courts.”); see also Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (reserving the jury trial right to crimes punishable by
more than six months’ imprisonment).
209. Cf. Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 775, 834–37
(2016) (arguing that courts should consider collateral consequences in determining which
procedural protections to afford a defendant).
210. Cf., e.g., Kirk R. Williams et al., Public Knowledge of Statutory Penalties: The
Extent and Basis of Accurate Perception, 23 Pac. Soc. Rev. 105, 117 (1980) (concluding
that the general public underestimates the severity of sanctions). Perceptions may vary by
social class, depending upon the extent of peer contact with the system. Id. at 110.
211. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Plea Bargain, supra note 30, at 740 (discussing
“defendants’ collective action problem” in plea bargaining).
212. See id. at 739–40.
213. Id. at 743.
214. See id. at 769.
215. See supra notes 97–109.
216. Shoplifting Statistics, supra note 23.
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to boycott retail justice—is more credible than the threat of more
prosecutions in the plea bargaining case, as arrests and civil recovery are
cheaper than prosecutions.217 This matters because the expected costs of
an arrest alone—with its concomitant physical risk and collateral
consequences218—are likely higher for most suspects than the costs of
paying a retail justice company and completing its course. All the more
so once we factor in the chance of civil recovery and of prosecution
conditional on arrest, and if most suspects presented with the dilemma,
all of whom pass a criminal-history check, are risk averse.
2. Equality: Are Certain Groups of Suspects Worse Off? — Even if retail
justice is a good deal for most suspects, concerns may persist if its effects
are discriminatory on the basis of race, class, or some other morally
irrelevant characteristic. Notice that one’s conclusion on the former issue
frames the latter: If retail justice is a “good,” we should ensure that it is
not being reserved to the privileged classes. If retail justice is a “bad,”
however, our concern is that it is being forced upon disfavored groups.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this section makes the former assumption: that retail justice is generally beneﬁcial because it prevents harmful
contact with the criminal justice system.
The appropriate baseline for an analysis of distributive effects is the
manner in which the criminal justice system distributes criminality within
the large pool of individuals who cause others harm. Sociologist John
Hagan distinguishes between “suite” criminals, whose harmful and
immoral acts are frequently treated as noncriminal matters, and “street”
criminals, whose similarly motivated conduct is branded as deviant.219 A
similar dynamic marks the early history of retail theft, where
“kleptomania” or private payments shielded well-to-do ladies from the
criminal justice system, while poorer offenders went to jail.220 Some contemporary shoplifting research suggests that lower-class offenders
continue to be treated more harshly than wealthier ones, and there may
be age and race effects as well.221
Against this baseline, retail justice companies appear, at ﬁrst blush,
to promote equality by “leveling up,” extending to low-status individuals
the lenient treatment previously beyond their grasp.222 Retail justice, that
is, shelters not “suite” criminals but “street” criminals, and not just

217. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 177–183.
219. See generally John Hagan, Who Are the Criminals? (2012).
220. See supra notes 41–52 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 116–121 and accompanying text.
222. See generally James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the
Widening Divide Between America and Europe 10 (2003) (describing the gradual trend in
continental Europe by which the forms of imprisonment previously extended only to
aristocrats are now generalized and extended to the entire prison population).
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wealthy shoplifters but poor ones as well. And on its face, at least, it
applies even-handedly to suspects of every race and gender.223
There are, however, reasons to be cautious in this assessment. This
section quickly sketches out ﬁve. Three of these can be safely put to bed,
in the weak sense that they do not reveal retail justice to be worse than
the system that operates in its absence. The same may be true of the
remaining two, but the case is muddier. Accordingly, Part III recommends that lawmakers require retail justice companies to collect data
that will facilitate close monitoring of these distributive effects.
The ﬁrst concern stems from the fact that shoplifting is a “middleclass crime.” One might worry that retail justice coddles the middle class
while neglecting the truly poor—who may commit other forms of theft—
replicating the regressive class dynamic Hagan describes, just lower down
the economic ladder. Yet, if the research is to be believed, retailers already
favor the middle class over the poor.224 Perhaps more important,
shoplifting is a “middle-class crime” only in the sense that the middle
class is overrepresented in the population of offenders.225 In absolute
number, more shoplifters hail from the lowest income bracket than any
other.226
Second, shifting from public to “offender-funded” private justice
transfers the costs of shoplifting, in a rough sense, from taxpayers to
suspects. This cost structure may disproportionately burden the poorest
suspects. More than that, retail justice may simply be inaccessible to the
very poor, who cannot afford the enrollment fees. Retail justice
companies purport to make their programs accessible to all through a
combination of payment plans, discounts, and “tuition scholarships.”
CEC says that ninety percent of suspects presented with the option
choose to enroll.227 But we do not know why the other ten percent do not
or, relevant here, how many decline due to ﬁnancial constraints.
Yet the premise of this second point is false: Public justice, too,
makes its “users” foot the bill. “As criminal justice costs have
skyrocketed,” Professor Laura Appleman observes, criminal justice
institutions have begun to impose “fees and ﬁnes at every turn,” and thus
“the burden to fund the system has fallen largely on the system’s users,
primarily the poor or indigent.”228 Just as the fees paid to retail justice
companies disproportionately harm the poorest suspects, so, too, do the
223. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 41 (“[S]elective or discriminatory
enforcement . . . would be eliminated under a regime of private enforcement. The law
would be enforced against everyone who violated it and enforcement would not place a
particular . . . individual at an unfair disadvantage.”).
224. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
226. See Blanco et al., supra note 22, at 906 tbl.1 (reporting that 43.95% of shoplifters
have personal incomes under $20,000 and 22.37% have family incomes under $20,000).
227. See Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125.
228. Appleman, supra note 16, at 1485.
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criminal justice system’s fees.229 Even publicly funded counsel is no
longer free in most jurisdictions.230 Those who truly cannot pay spend
years ﬁghting their debts or, worse yet, are jailed for nonpayment,
leading observers to lament the return of debtors’ prisons.231
Third, it is not known where, geographically, retail justice companies
operate. We do know that they have serviced retailers frequented by both
the wealthy (Bloomingdale’s, for example) and less well off (such as
Walmart). But we do not know which Walmart stores, for example, used
their services. If the stores are situated primarily in (relatively) wealthier
regions or areas with racial demographics that skew white, then retail
justice may be sheltering those populations disproportionately, with
economically or racially regressive effects. And because private industry is
choosing whom to protect, there is no obvious mechanism through
which an angry public can hold the responsible parties to account.
We are not so demanding of criminal justice institutions in this
respect, however. While selective enforcement and prosecution are
prohibited, courts have made discrimination virtually impossible for
defendants to prove.232 And we certainly do not demand equality across
jurisdictions as opposed to within them. If the criminal justice authorities
in heavily black City A decide to enforce shoplifting laws to the hilt, for
instance, while mostly white City B’s authorities are far more lenient, a
black shoplifting defendant in City A cannot point to City B in support of
a selective-prosecution claim. (That is not to say the law has this right,
however. Part III advocates data collection that would permit review of
precisely this type of disparity within retail justice.)
Now for the two more nagging concerns: One is that the retail
justice apparatus may enable or encourage store security to be more
aggressive in ways that bear disproportionately on disfavored groups.
This is not inevitable—one can imagine a world in which store security
229. See id. (“[F]unding of the criminal justice system has disproportionately fallen
on those least able to pay.”).
230. See, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants
Pay for Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 323, 324 (2009); Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 Iowa L. Rev.
1929, 1929 (2014). For a state-by-state list of so-called recoupment laws, see Harris, supra
note 181, at 28–41 & tbl.2.4.
231. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 181, at 50–51 (describing the social consequences of
imposing monetary sanctions and incarcerating debtors for nonpayment); Appleman,
supra note 16, at 1489–92 (describing the “long and unsavory history” of “incarcerating
the impoverished” in the United States).
232. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996) (requiring litigants who
allege discriminatory prosecution to meet an intentionally demanding standard); Bonita
R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Targets Minority
Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 Mich. J. Race & L. 305, 318–19 (2007)
(analogizing the standard of review for selective prosecution claims to the standard for equal
protection claims, which requires a showing that any discriminatory impact have a
discriminatory purpose).
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do not change how they patrol when retailers shift from public to private
justice. If retail justice companies pay retailers or security ﬁrms for each
enrollee, however, these payments may, as San Francisco alleges,
“encourage[] security companies . . . to target not just individuals who
may have shoplifted, but those who are most likely to fear getting turned
over to the police” (who, presumably, are most likely to enroll).233
It is not entirely clear what San Francisco has in mind as the target
population here. The dynamics are complex. Different social groups may
dread police contact for different reasons—the fear of physical
mistreatment (perhaps highest among young black males), for example,
versus the fear of deep social and professional embarrassment (perhaps
highest among wealthy, middle-aged, white professionals), versus the fear
of deportation (for undocumented immigrants). One might just as well
assume security guards would target individuals they think are most likely
to be able to pay retail justice enrollment costs—those who appear to
have money to spare.234 Data collection is necessary to resolve this
concern with any conﬁdence.
Finally, there is the fact that, after querying both internal and public
records, retail justice companies refer repeat offenders to the police.
This is a sensible approach to deterrence: Prior sanctions failed, suggesting the need for harsher medicine. Yet the practice bakes in whatever
biases infected earlier interactions with enforcement authorities. If we
believe the police (public or private) disproportionately target black
men, for example235—or that customers are more likely to report
apparent thefts by blacks than whites236—then a suspect’s prior record
233. S.F. Complaint, supra note 6, at 2; see also id. at 5 (“At particular risk of
exploitation are those individuals who a security guard perceives would be most likely to
buckle under CEC’s high-pressure tactics, perhaps out of fear of being turned over to law
enforcement.”).
234. Cf. Elliott Ash et al., Local Public Finance and Discriminatory Policing: Evidence
from Traffic Stops in Missouri 3–4 (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-591, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192562 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that,
when local governments are under budget stress, traffic citation rates increase, with
increases concentrated on white drivers and largest where white-to-black income ratio is
highest).
235. For evidence suggesting that rates of shoplifting are similar across racial groups,
see supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. For evidence that members of racial
minority groups are nonetheless apprehended for shoplifting at disproportionate rates,
see, e.g., Cohen & Stark, supra note 112, at 33 ﬁg.1 (ﬁnding that black and Mexican
American shoppers were apprehended out of proportion with their presence in the
shopping public); see also George Won & George Yamamoto, Social Structure and Deviant
Behavior: A Study in Shoplifting, 53 Soc. & Soc. Res. 44, 52 tbl.vi (1968) (same for native
Hawaiians); Nat’l Coal. to Prevent Shoplifting, Program Guide, supra note 77, at 4
(discussing a survey of 3,550 retailers in which forty-six percent opined that racial
minorities were more prone to shoplift than whites).
236. Cf. Max C. Dertke et al., Observer’s Reporting of Shoplifting as a Function of
Thief’s Race and Sex, 94 J. Soc. Psychol. 213, 217–18 (1974) (ﬁnding no statistically
signiﬁcant difference in white customers reporting thefts by black versus white thieves, but
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depends in part on his race. By relying on this measure, the retail justice
companies discriminate as well.
How this compares to the alternative, however, is an empirical
question. Relative to a retailer employing a zero-tolerance policy, which
calls the police on every suspected shoplifter, retail justice companies may
fare poorly. But zero-tolerance policies appear to be rare. More often,
retailers make discretionary decisions, or apply some simple rules of
thumb, to determine when to make the call.237 Given the discretion
involved—and that one rule of thumb in fact has been to call the police
on repeat offenders—it would not be surprising if bias played a more,
not less, important role when retail justice is absent. Retail justice
companies, in other words, introduce (or perhaps exacerbate) one
potential bias (from prior police interactions) but eliminate another
(from the discretionary decision of when to call the police). The latter
bias may well outweigh the former, but it is hard be sure. Again, more
data are necessary to answer this question.
3. Overenforcement: The Costs of Casting a Wider Net. — The proﬁt
motive, critics contend, creates incentives for overzealous enforcement of
the law, possibly sweeping in innocent as well as guilty defendants. San
Francisco’s lawsuit alleges, in this vein, that CEC’s “payment structure
creates a powerful incentive to pressure people to enroll in CEC,
regardless of the evidence, if any, of their guilt.”238
Academics have debated the basic point for decades. In the 1970s,
economists Gary Becker and George Stigler sketched out a system in
which private citizens investigate crimes, apprehend and try suspected
offenders, and retain the proceeds, such as ﬁnes convicted defendants
pay.239 Professors William Landes and Richard Posner countered that a
public monopoly on criminal law enforcement may be preferable
because it enables “discretionary nonenforcement” of the law by
prosecutors.240 Discretionary nonenforcement is an efficient way to temper the (inevitable) overinclusivity of criminal statutes without creating
loopholes for defendants.241
Decades later, the Landes–Posner notion of “discretionary
nonenforcement” became the linchpin of Professor Ric Simmons’s
argument to prohibit (most) private criminal settlements, like the ones
retail justice companies facilitate. Simmons argues that private criminal
settlements should be prohibited “because they remove the prosecutor
that, when prompted to conﬁrm having witnessed a theft, thefts by blacks were conﬁrmed
more often).
237. See supra section I.B.
238. S.F. Complaint, supra note 6, at 2.
239. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. Legal Stud. 1, 13–17 (1974).
240. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 38–41.
241. See id.

2292

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:2251

from the settlement process.”242 “[T]he prosecutor,” Simmons reasons,
“plays a critical role in selecting which cases should be prosecuted, how
they should be charged, and what sentence is appropriate.”243 “[T]he
parties who negotiate a private criminal settlement,” in contrast, “do not
practice discretionary nonenforcement.”244
As a descriptive matter, it is misleading to say that retail justice
companies usurp the prosecutorial role or edge prosecutors out of the
picture. Prosecutors simply exercise their discretion at the wholesale
level.245 They are not unaware of what retail justice companies are
doing;246 indeed, at least some prosecutors actively encourage it.247
Prosecutors bent instead on preserving their monopoly could simply
subpoena retail justice companies’ business records and prosecute some
of their “students,” which would quickly put an end to the business
endeavor.248 In a sense, San Francisco’s lawsuit, which seeks to rout retail
justice companies from the jurisdiction, is the exception that proves the
rule.249

242. Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, supra note 12, at 1131.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1187.
245. Not always—apparently, in some jurisdictions, prosecutors preapprove each
individual suspect for participation in a retail justice program. Telephone Interview with
Paul Stewart, supra note 161.
246. See Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, at 12 (explaining that CEC’s policy is
to “reach[] out to local criminal justice system stakeholders about the program” before
conducting business in a particular jurisdiction); Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton,
supra note 136 (explaining that CEC “always” informs police and prosecutors when it
enters a new jurisdiction).
247. See Huntsman Declaration, supra note 128, exh. D (letter of support for a trial
period from the San Diego County District Attorney); CEC Inform, CEC, https://
correctiveeducation.com/home/cec-inform (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Sept. 15, 2017) (“The States Attorneys [sic] office is supportive of any Retailer’s
decisions to implement a Restorative Justice Program.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Eighth Judicial Circuit of Florida)); Jessica Pishko, ‘Restorative Justice’ for
Shoplifting? A Court Calls It Extortion, The Marshall Project (Oct. 30, 2017),
http://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/30/restorative-justice-for-shoplifting-a-courtcalls-it-extortion [https://perma.cc/KWP6-N3AX] (“Law enforcement . . . is supportive in
most states.”); cf. Arlington Police, supra note 147 (“Walmart and CEC have been
incredible partners in looking at innovative ways to reduce criminalization and look for
alternative methods in dealing with the ongoing issues related to misdemeanor thefts.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Police Chief Will Johnson)); Knapp, supra
note 148 (“Our department and departments across the country are in favor of programs
that are like this.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a police official)).
248. Cf. Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, supra note 10, at 960 (“[A] private criminal
justice system will only exist . . . at the suffrage of the criminal justice system. If the public
authorities . . . believe that a private criminal justice system is inappropriate, all they need to do
is . . . bring formal criminal charges against all the defendants regardless of the outcome . . . .”).
249. Even in San Francisco, it seems, CEC operated with the knowledge of the District
Attorney, as opposed to the City Attorney who ﬁled suit. Telephone Interview with Brian
Ashton, supra note 136.

2018]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC.

2293

This descriptive point, however, even if correct, does not resolve any
normative concerns about overenforcement—most signiﬁcantly, whether
retail justice encourages the enforcement of shoplifting laws against
innocent suspects, as San Francisco alleges. It helps here to distinguish
between “actually innocent” defendants, who have not in fact violated
the law, and “normatively innocent” defendants, who “did it . . . [but]
did not thereby offend the public’s moral code.”250 Normative innocence
is a state of “relative blameworthiness,” resulting from a normative
judgment of whether the defendant “ought to be charged.”251
There are powerful disincentives for store security to target actually
innocent individuals. The prospect of tort liability for false imprisonment
and related harms undoubtedly looms large, especially when, as is
common, surveillance video has captured the pertinent events. Retailers
also wish to avoid the negative publicity wrongful accusations bring
about. Indeed, this pair of concerns has long been thought to motivate
retailers’ relatively lax approach toward shoplifting detection. There is
no persuasive evidence that the incentives retail justice creates, at least to
date, are strong enough to turn the tide.
The harder question concerns the effects of retail justice on
normatively innocent suspects, for whom the prospect of increased
enforcement seems more plausible. The evidence suggests, however, that
such suspects are rare. In their discussion of overenforcement, Landes
and Posner were concerned with prohibited conduct “that the
legislature . . . did not in fact want to forbid.”252 Their examples involve
“minor infractions of the traffic code” and “violations of building-code
provisions that, if enforced, would prevent the construction of new
buildings in urban areas.”253 Likewise, in his work on normative
innocence, Professor Josh Bowers focuses on “petty crimes that typically
lack concrete victims,” many of which are “mala prohibita offenses.”254
Bowers gives examples like “an indigent man . . . arrested for hopping a
turnstile to get to his ﬁrst day of work” and “an elderly man . . . arrested
for selling ice pops without a license on a hot summer day.”255
As sympathetic as some shoplifters surely are, few, if any, of them are
normatively innocent under these frameworks. There can be little doubt
that the legislature did intend to criminalize even small-ticket retail thefts
by individuals in great need. Nor is shoplifting merely a victimless,
regulatory offense. That so many shoplifters historically have escaped
prosecution likely reﬂects judgments about prosecutorial resource
250. Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 33, at 1658 (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal
Procedure: First Principles 90 (1997)).
251. Id.
252. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 38.
253. Id.
254. Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 33, at 1659, 1666.
255. Id. at 1658.
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constraints and priorities rather than judgments about normative
innocence the retail justice companies now upset.256
A separate overenforcement concern involves concededly guilty suspects. If the proﬁt motive of retail justice motivates more aggressive
enforcement of shoplifting laws—or greater efficiency enables it—then
retail justice may feed the beast of overcriminalization. For example, a
retailer that, before contracting with a retail justice company, only rarely
called the police, may now sanction a much larger percentage of
suspected shoplifters. This is troubling for those who believe that
society’s principal criminal justice problem is not underenforcement but
its opposite.
There are several reasons, however, that the overcriminalization
argument is more complicated, and probably weaker, than it ﬁrst appears. As an initial matter, the fact that society has criminalized shoplifting might be thought to signal that, setting aside enforcement costs, the
efficient level of shoplifting is zero.257 That more guilty individuals are
sanctioned, the argument goes, moves us closer to that ideal and cannot
count as a demerit for retail justice.258
Skeptics should consider two additional points. First, as mentioned
earlier, retailers that work with retail justice companies—at least with
CEC—specify eligibility criteria including age and item value.259
Reportedly, many retailers do not turn suspects over to CEC whom, based
on these criteria, they would not have referred to the police.260 Retail
justice, in other words, does not necessarily lead retailers to cast a wider
net. Second, even if some retailers do now cast a wider net, the
consequences of being ensnared, which involve no contact with the
criminal justice system, are less severe.261 Retail justice thus distributes
256. Indeed, Bowers argues that prosecutors typically ignore issues of normative
innocence in petty crime cases “because of keen institutional pressures to charge
reﬂexively.” Id. at 1661.
257. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1548–50
(1984); see also Devlin, supra note 170, at 106–08 (discussing “coercive transfers that take
place in low transaction cost environments” as a type of crime that, “in the absence of
enforcement costs, society ought to eliminate on the basis of efficiency”).
258. See Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
43, 62 (1992) (“That the ‘victim’ [of incriminatory blackmail] might be made worse off by
the prohibition of blackmail is irrelevant for the obvious reason that crimes do not ordinarily
deserve to be concealed.”); cf. id. (“[D]isclosure is in fact the morally preferred state of
affairs.”).
259. See notes 151–154 and accompanying text.
260. Telephone Interview with Brian Ashton, supra note 136.
261. Conditional on being apprehended, suspects’ expected sanctions must be less
than in the criminal justice system or else they will reject any private settlement offer.
Private sanctions, in theory, should reﬂect the probability that the prosecutor would
decline to prosecute. Cf. Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1956–57
(demonstrating that “allowing blackmail will not necessarily overdeter when prosecutors
exercise discretion to decline prosecution of the blackmailee’s crime,” because “the
probability of prosecution can affect the blackmailer’s demand”).
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punishment more equitably across the population of offenders. To put
the point differently, we might just as well say that the net has narrowed
in the sense that fewer, rather than more, shoplifting suspects will enter
the criminal justice system.
B.

Are Victims Worse Off?

It might seem odd that retailers, which long have lamented the
scourge of shoplifting, would abandon the criminal justice system in
favor of a more lenient, private alternative. Why would retailers not want
the strongest deterrent sanctions available?262 Is it possible that, in opting
for retail justice, retailers actually act against self-interest?
It is possible, but unlikely. These retailers are sophisticated entities
that contract for retail justice under calm conditions with ample
information. The interesting question is not whether retail justice makes
retailers better off but why it seems to do so. Some possibilities have been
mentioned above, but a deeper exploration is now in order.
As an initial matter, it is not actually clear that the premise of the
question posed here—that is, that retailers are embracing a more lenient
approach—is true. The reasons recall the preceding discussion of
overenforcement. It does seem fair to assume that, in an individual case,
criminal sanctions inﬂict more disutility on the suspect than the retail
justice companies’ fees and coursework.263 From the prospective
offender’s viewpoint, however, the relevant question concerns not the
actual but rather the expected sanctions in each system. Expected sanctions, of course, fold in not only the anticipated magnitude of sanctions
but also the likelihood of apprehension and the likelihood of sanctions
conditional on apprehension.
Because the mechanism for apprehension—the retailer’s private
police—is held constant across the two systems, the likelihood of
apprehension should not differ drastically. But it should be slightly
higher in the retail justice setting if the private police use time they save
processing offenders to apprehend additional suspects,264 or if they are

262. The assumption here is that criminal punishment generally tends to deter
shoplifting. The possibility that it does not is addressed in section II.C.2.a. See also, e.g.,
Klemke, Apprehension for Shoplifting, supra note 191, at 401 (ﬁnding serious reasons to
doubt that criminal punishment deters shoplifting).
263. Although the retail justice companies would likely resist the characterization of
their fees as “sanctions,” from the offender’s perspective, certainly they are that. Cf.
Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 128 (“These more positive approaches
may still be viewed as punishment by involuntary subjects . . . .”); Levmore & Fagan, supra
note 18, at 312–13 (“[T]he higher price a party pays for secrecy might deter misbehavior
as successfully as any legal remedy, and the latter normally comes at a greater social cost.”).
Otherwise, we would expect there to be a market, outside the setting discussed here, for
the “restorative justice” courses the retail justice companies administer.
264. See Turning Point Justice, Retailers, supra note 158 (claiming this beneﬁt).
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given ﬁnancial incentives to procure retail justice “students.”265 The
likelihood of sanctions conditional on apprehension may also rise with
the shift to retail justice, but heterogeneously across retailers, depending
upon the criteria used to establish eligibility for enrollment.
All things considered, then, retail justice likely substitutes weaker but
more certain sanctions for stronger, less certain ones. Retail justice
companies also dispense sanctions more swiftly.266 Empirical research
consistently attributes deterrence more to the certainty and celerity of
sanctions than to their severity.267 Accordingly, the retail justice companies’ claims to effective deterrence may be more plausible than they
initially appear.268 (The comparative claims may be misleading
nonetheless, given the low baseline rates of recidivism for ﬁrst-time
shoplifters who are apprehended.269)
In any event, regardless which system better deters potential shoplifters, the choice to opt for retail justice does make one thing clear:
Retailers believe their return on investment in deterrence is higher in
the private than the public system. But this, too, might seem odd, for
economists have long regarded crime deterrence as a classic public
good.270 Government must provide a criminal justice system, the argument goes, precisely because private parties will view the returns as
insufficient to motivate adequate investment in deterring crime. This is
because private actors cannot capture all the beneﬁts of their expenditures on deterrence—if I hire a security guard to patrol in front of my
house at night, my next-door neighbors beneﬁt as well, with no
obligation to contribute.271
In fact, retailers have already paid taxes to ﬁnance the police,
prosecutors, courts, and prisons. Why bypass these public institutions?
265. See, e.g., S.F. Complaint, supra note 6, at 2 (alleging that CEC paid private police
ﬁrms ten dollars per enrollee).
266. See Turning Point Justice, supra note 28 (emphasizing the program’s “immediate
consequences that are proportionate with the offense”).
267. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, An Honest Politician’s Guide to Deterrence: Certainty,
Severity, Celerity, and Parsimony, in 23 Deterrence, Choice, and Crime 365, 374 (Daniel S.
Nagin et al. eds., 2018) (summarizing research). This is not inconsistent with the supposition
made elsewhere that first-time shoplifting suspects may tend to be risk averse. See Murat C.
Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Identifying Criminals’ Risk Preferences, 91 Ind. L.J. 791, 793–94
(2016).
268. Cf. Levmore & Fagan, supra note 18, at 328 (“There will, therefore, be cases
where private agreements provide more deterrence than the criminal law and it is for this
reason that the law ought to tolerate some experimentation with private agreements in
lieu of criminal charges.”).
269. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (surveying sources highlighting the
low recidivism rates after ﬁrst apprehension).
270. See, e.g., Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a
Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1181, 1201 (1994)
[hereinafter Harel, Efficiency and Fairness] (describing the “widely held belief that
protection [from crime] is a pure public good”).
271. See id. at 1202 n.55.
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Retailers that opt out cannot, of course, demand a tax refund. The
obvious answer might be the kickback from retail justice companies,
when available, but this is ultimately a sideshow; many retailers continue
to work with CEC even absent this minor remuneration. The better
explanation is that, notwithstanding that retailers have paid taxes,
prosecution of shoplifters in the criminal justice system remains costly
and inefficient from the retailers’ perspective. The taxes paid are sunk
costs and what drives retailers is the price of going forward.
Assisting in the public prosecution of shoplifting suspects is costly to
retailers in several ways.272 Employees may need to testify or sit for
interviews with police detectives during business hours. The merchandise
in question may languish in evidence lockers, unavailable for sale.
Frequent visits from the police, to take suspects into custody, could drive
away other customers who see the police as a threat or as a signal that
criminal activity is afoot. Retailers may even be reluctant to lose the
business of the suspected shoplifter himself, who may double as a paying
customer or whose family and friends may be regulars.273
What the retailers receive from the criminal justice system in return,
moreover, often proves too paltry to justify the costs. In many jurisdictions, shoplifting is a low-priority crime. Police response to calls can be
slow—requiring the retailer to maintain prolonged custody over the
suspect—and prosecution infrequent.274 The criminal justice system
simply does not provide a service valuable enough—or deterrence strong
enough—to justify the costs of participating in it. Of course, the quantity
of criminal justice resources available to ﬁght shoplifting is not ﬁxed. In
theory, the state could respond to these constraints by sending help.
Indeed, some police departments have hired additional officers
speciﬁcally to respond to calls from Walmart.275 Yet this seems not to be
the norm.
In addition, just as in the initial public-good analysis, the retailer
cannot capture all the beneﬁts of its expenditures on deterrence here,
inside the criminal justice system, either. A retailer’s participation
beneﬁts other outlets the suspect may have targeted. In other words,
because victims are required to expend resources (beyond background
taxation) to obtain deterrence through the criminal justice system, and

272. See, e.g., Joh, Conceptualizing, supra note 14, at 590 (“Assisting in a formal
police investigation [costs] . . . time and effort . . . , as well as the potential for negative
publicity . . . which may be more costly than the initial disruption.”).
273. My colleague and Dean Tom Miles suggested that, in this way, we might view retail
justice as a kind of customer loyalty program.
274. See Laird, supra note 163, at 18–19.
275. See Barbaro, supra note 111 (explaining the burden that Walmart’s zerotolerance policy placed on local police departments); Pettypiece & Voreacos, supra note
101 (describing an officer known to his colleagues as “Officer Walmart”).
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because those expenditures produce positive externalities, the criminal
justice system has not solved the public-good problem after all.276
* * *
To nail down the point and to tee up the next section’s analysis,
consider who bears the costs of shoplifting under three different systems
of law enforcement.277 In the ﬁrst, retailers do nothing other than expel
red-handed shoplifters with a warning. They then attempt to shift the
costs of their inventory “shrinkage”—which are relatively high, given
their lackluster efforts at deterrence—onto their customers in the form
of increased prices. To the extent that market competition prevents them
from transferring all the expenses, this do-nothing approach effectively
allocates the costs of shoplifting to the retailers and their customers
together.
The second approach—criminal prosecution of some suspects—
spreads the costs more widely. Here, the taxpayers bear the expense of
the justice system’s deterrence-producing institutions, partially offset by
“user fees” collected from suspects and defendants. Retailers assume the
costs of assisting the prosecution as well as the residual costs of
shrinkage, some of which they pass through to their customers.
Finally, consider the retail justice model. Retail justice, recall, is
entirely “offender funded.” Taxpayers bear no enforcement costs
because the criminal justice system’s institutions are not involved in any
way. Retailers bear no enforcement costs either, as they simply hand off
suspects to the retail justice companies. In fact, the retailers may make
money in the form of kickbacks. The net effect is to shift costs from
retailers, customers, and taxpayers onto the suspects themselves. It is not
hard to understand why retailers would prefer this option. And it looks
appealing from society’s perspective as well, if it produces deterrence
more efficiently.278
C.

Is Society Worse Off?

This last point turns out to be more complex than it ﬁrst appears.
This section contemplates the effects of retail justice on social welfare
beyond the interests of suspects and victims. It begins with a discussion of
the social costs of crime, focusing on prevention and enforcement costs,
before pivoting to consider the more diffuse effects of decreased
transparency.
276. See Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, The Role of Private Action in Controlling
Crime, in Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs 331, 331, 346 (Philip J. Cook et al.
eds., 2011).
277. I set aside the costs of the private police, which are constant.
278. See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 18, at 313 (arguing that private settlement can
deter wrongdoers at a lower cost than the legal system would).
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1. The Social Costs of Crime. — Society’s goal, within a utilitarian
framework, is to minimize the total social costs of crime, which include
the direct costs incurred by victims, the costs of prevention and enforcement, and any unjustiﬁed costs imposed on defendants and their
families.279 In some settings, private settlement of criminal disputes would
raise concerns about insufficient general deterrence, if victims settle for
too little when prosecution was otherwise likely.280 Underdeterrence
seems improbable here, where the “ﬁne” is a multiple of the average
shoplifting take,281 and where retailers have continued contact with the
offenders. Especially outside the biggest cities, individuals who shoplift
from major retailers likely continue, out of practical necessity, to
patronize those same stores in the future. This means retailers at least
partly internalize the expected costs of monitoring and recidivism,
motivating them to seek socially efficient levels of deterrence.282
The more interesting issue concerns prevention and enforcement
costs. Retail justice companies may minimize these costs to retailers, but
they do so partly by externalizing them—that is, by shifting them to
suspects. This cost externalization may, in some cases, create incentives
for retailers that are perverse from society’s perspective. The crucial
point is that the availability of a costless (or even proﬁtable) mechanism
for adjudicating and sanctioning shoplifting encourages retailers to favor
enforcement when prevention (that is, victim precautions) might deter
crime more efficiently.
The choice between prevention and enforcement is ubiquitous in
society, yet the pertinent legal literature is surprisingly thin.283 Potential
279. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in Essays
in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 1, 40 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds.,
1974).
280. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 42 (arguing that legalizing private forms of
enforcement, like blackmail, might lead “the blackmailer [to] sell his incriminating
information to the offender for a price lower than the statutory cost of punishment to the
criminal, which would reduce the effective cost of punishment . . . below the level set by the
legislature”).
281. See Clint Rainey & Allegra Hobbs, Been Caught Stealing, N.Y. Mag. (Dec. 8,
2013), http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/topic/shoplifting-2013-12 [https://perma.cc/
D559-89XU] (reporting an average retail theft by customers of $129).
282. See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 18, at 323–24.
283. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Harel, Economics, supra note 31, at 299–301 (exploring
how sanctions imposed on pre-crime activities alter victims’ incentives to take preventive
measures); Harel, Efficiency and Fairness, supra note 270, at 1196 (suggesting that
criminal law should embrace the principle of comparative fault to encourage victims to
take precautions against crime); Robert A. Mikos, “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions,
and the Societal Beneﬁts of Shifting Crime, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 308–09 (2006)
(suggesting that, while crime prevention measures might displace crime rather than
reduce the amount of total crime, such displacement may be beneﬁcial). There is also an
economics literature on point. See, e.g., Ann P. Bartel, An Analysis of Firm Demand for
Protection Against Crime, 4 J. Legal. Stud. 443, 443–44 (1975) (exploring what factors
impact a ﬁrm’s decision to make private expenditures to prevent crime); Omri Ben-Shahar
& Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against
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victims often employ the two strategies simultaneously. I rely on the
criminal justice system to deter home invasions by catching and
punishing burglars, for example, but I also lock my door. The hard
question concerns the socially optimal level of precautions—should I not
only lock my door but also build a moat? Victims, it turns out, commonly
take too few or too many precautions, depending on the circumstances.
Victims overinvest in precautions that generate negative externalities, such as diverting crime toward other victims.284 Victims underinvest,
in contrast, in precautions that generate positive externalities, such as
deterring crime against other victims.285 The classic example involves
competing precautions against auto theft: The Club, a pole-like device
that locks the steering wheel, and Lojack, a radio transmitter that allows
police to locate a stolen car. The Club merely displaces crime to other
owners. Not so for Lojack—in fact, because potential thieves cannot tell
which cars have Lojack, Lojack reduces theft for every car that might have
Lojack. The predictable result? “People buy too many Clubs and not
enough Lojacks.”286
Familiar precautions for retailers include strategic lighting and store
layout, security cameras, greeters, well-spaced personnel, item placement
(with small, valuable items out of customer reach), and security tags.287
Retailers employ these precautions to varying degrees, and they seem to
make a difference. Indeed, data from observational studies of customers show great variance among stores in rates of shoplifting. One interpretation of these data is that “certain characteristics of stores should . . .
be considered as an important variable influencing the amount of
Crime, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 434, 434–35 (1995) (arguing that “victims of crime may also
be in a position to take enforcement measures that may deter crime and substitute or
complement the government’s effort” and discussing how to make victims’ incentives
more efficient); Charles T. Clotfelter, Private Security and the Public Safety, 5 J. Urb. Econ.
388, 390–91 (1978) (examining the demand for private protection and the impact of such
protection on crime rates); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private
Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 123, 123 (1991) (showing why
crime victims may not take the socially optimal level of precaution).
284. See Ben-Shahar & Harel, Economics, supra note 31, at 309–11 (“One factor that
may lead to excessive investment in precautions, and which has gained much attention in
the literature, is the diversion or displacement of crime.”). But see Mikos, supra note 283,
at 310 (arguing that crime diversion or displacement is socially beneﬁcial because it shifts
crime away from “eggshell victims,” who suffer relatively high levels of harm and thus
invest more in precautions).
285. See Ben-Shahar & Harel, Economics, supra note 31, at 311–12.
286. Barry Nalebuff & Ian Ayres, Why Not?: How to Use Everyday Ingenuity to Solve
Problems Big and Small 24 (2006); see also Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring
Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of
Lojack, 113 Q.J. Econ. 43, 44–45 (1998) (“An individual car owner’s decision to install a
Lojack only trivially affects the likelihood of his or her own vehicle being stolen since
thieves base their theft decisions on mean Lojack installation rates.”).
287. See, e.g., Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 130–33; Shteir, supra
note 20, at 171–95.
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shoplifting that occurs.”288 “Certain stores,” that is, “may be viewed as
prime targets for shoplifting because of the nature or quality of
merchandise, or because they are seen as having poor security.”289
While it is hard to be sure, there is reason to think at least some
retailers employ these measures too sparingly. In an echo of Victorian era
rhetoric about the devilish temptations of department stores, that is
certainly the sense one gets when reading media coverage of Walmart’s
enormous demands on the police. Walmart, some experts say, “lays out
its stores in a way that invites trouble and often doesn’t have enough
uniformed employees to make sure everything runs smoothly.”290 Its
stores “can feel messy and disheveled,” allowing “troublemakers to
rationalize that the company doesn’t care.”291 Journalists found that
Walmart stores call the police far more often than Target stores in the
same jurisdiction, even when controlling for store size and hours of
operation.292 This discrepancy suggests that there is ample room within a
successful business model for greater investment in precautions. And
given that most shoplifting is situational and impulsive, rather than
premeditated,293 such investment ought to reduce aggregate theft rather
than merely displace it.294

288. Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 10–11 (discussing Abigail Buckle
& David P. Farrington, An Observational Study of Shoplifting, 24 Brit. J. Criminology 63
(1984)).
289. Id. For direct evidence that precautions reduce shoplifting, see David P.
Farrington et al., An Experiment on the Prevention of Shoplifting, 1 Crime Prevention
Stud. 93, 107–10 (1993) (ﬁnding that electronic tagging caused a lasting decrease in
shoplifting, store redesign caused an immediate decrease that wore off, and uniformed
guards had no effect); M. Patrick McNees et al., Shoplifting Prevention: Providing
Information Through Signs, 9 J. Applied Behav. Analysis 399, 402–03 (1976) (ﬁnding that
both general and item-speciﬁc signage reduced theft).
290. Sampson et al., supra note 100; see also Pettypiece & Voreacos, supra note 101
(quoting police criticism of Walmart’s theft-prevention efforts); Scott E. Wolfe & David C.
Pyrooz, Rolling Back Prices and Raising Crime Rates? The Walmart Effect on Crime in the
United States, 54 Brit. J. Criminology 199, 210–14 (2014) (finding that crime fell more slowly
in the 1990s in counties where Walmart built stores). More generally, see Ian J. Abramson,
Shoplifting: Fastest-Growing, Hardest-to-Control Crime, Volume Retail Merchandising, Feb.
1983, at 2, 2 (blaming retailers for “creating an atmosphere for impulse buyers without
adequate security” and thereby “encouraging possible customers to indulge in ‘impulse
shoplifting’”).
291. Sampson et al., supra note 100; see also Charles Fishman, The Wal-Mart Effect
202–04 (2006) (describing Walmart’s shopping environment).
292. See Sampson et al., supra note 100; see also Pettypiece & Voreacos, supra note
101.
293. See Blanco et al., supra note 22, at 911–12.
294. See generally Rob T. Guerette & Kate J. Bowers, Assessing the Extent of Crime
Displacement and Diffusion of Beneﬁts: A Review of Situational Crime Prevention
Evaluations, 47 Criminology 1331, 1356–57 (2009) (reviewing 102 studies and concluding
that “crime displacement seems to be the exception rather than the rule, and it is
sometimes more likely that diffusion of crime-control beneﬁt will occur”).
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Most often, as in the home-invasion example, the preventionenforcement question concerns the allocation of crime-deterrence
responsibility between private victims and public authorities.295 In the
retail justice context, however, the analysis differs. As noted, retail justice
companies permit retailers to shift deterrence-related costs from
themselves (and their customers) to suspects. Whether this makes society
better off depends on whether retailers or suspects are the “least cost
avoiders.” It is tempting to think the answer is obvious—it must be
suspects, who can avoid the costs simply by refraining from offending (or
arousing suspicion). But this misapprehends the real issue.
As Professor Alon Harel argues, “The identiﬁcation of the criminal
as the ‘cheaper cost avoider’ does indeed mean that it is socially desirable
that criminals avoid carrying out crimes. But given the persistence of
criminal activity, the salient question is who should bear the costs of
preventing such activity.”296 In the traditional case, again, we compare the
cost of victim precautions with the cost of state enforcement.297 Here,
instead, we compare the cost of victim precautions with the cost of retail
justice enforcement, which, of course, is ultimately ﬁnanced by suspects’
fees. Costs in the retail justice model include the expense of developing
and administering the “restorative justice” course, the creation and
maintenance of supportive technology,298 and the time spent by suspects
taking the course. It seems plausible that these costs exceed the expense
to retailers of some of the common precautions mentioned above. In
sum, while retail justice may reduce enforcement costs relative to the
criminal justice system, victim precautions might—in some situations,
even if not in many—reduce them even further.
2. Transparency. — By operating wholly outside official institutions,
critics argue, retail justice undermines “the community’s collective
interest in the administration of justice as a public event that binds and
deﬁnes us.”299 More concretely, retail justice frustrates popular oversight
295. See generally Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution,
27 RAND J. Econ. 197, 197–98 (1996) [hereinafter Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement]
(arguing that victims have insufficient incentives to take precautions against crime because
they externalize the cost of public law enforcement).
296. Harel, Efficiency and Fairness, supra note 270, at 1198–99. For a different way of
framing the issue, see Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement, supra note 295, at 198–99 & n.9
(deﬁning “offender precaution” to include “the proﬁts forgone by an offender who
chooses not to commit a crime,” and arguing that “[i]f victim precaution is cheaper than
offender precaution (or forbearance), then an optimal punishment policy might require
more precautionary effort from victims and less from offenders”).
297. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 239 (7th ed. 2007)
(“[T]hrowing responsibility onto the victim might minimize aggregate social costs. It costs
something, though very little, to lock one’s car—less than it would cost the criminal justice
system to bring the thief to justice.”).
298. See, e.g., CEC, supra note 2 (describing program technologies available on multiple
computer platforms).
299. Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1967; see also S.F.
Complaint, supra note 6, at 15 (“The fact that CEC operates entirely outside the criminal
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of the criminal process, deprives citizens of valuable information about
offenders in their midst, and silences public condemnation which, on
some theories, differentiates the criminal process from all others. These
three critiques are considered in turn, followed by a discussion of the
effects of retail justice on official crime data.
Initially, notice that, without secrecy, the retailer and suspect never
reach a bargain. Secrecy is what the suspect pays for. For these
transparency considerations to win out, then, the beneﬁts of publicity
must outweigh any welfare gains already discussed.300
a. The Publicity Norm in Criminal Cases. — The public jury trial
remains the gold standard for American criminal justice. In reality,
however, the trial’s rarity, not its quality, makes it precious. Only a fraction of shoplifting charges lead to public trials; prosecutors drop some
cases, divert others, and plead out most of the rest.301 Plea bargaining
nominally takes place under the auspices of a public system, but the deals
themselves are struck behind closed doors.302 Increasingly, the public is
excluded even from the parts of the plea process that are supposed to be
transparent.303
It turns out, then, that the public’s ability to audit the criminal
process by observing its institutions at work is illusory, at least in the
mine-run misdemeanor case.304 It is far from clear that the shift from
plea bargaining to retail justice meaningfully exacerbates the problem.
At most, the difference is one of degree.
On the second point—that retail justice deprives the public of useful
information about offenders, preventing, for example, the identiﬁcation
of potentially troublesome recidivists305—the realities of criminal justice
justice system strips district attorneys’ offices of any and all oversight functions . . . .”);
Neyfakh, Make a Deal, supra note 125 (“There’s no judicial oversight, there are no
constitutional protections, there’s no due process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Susannah Karlsson)).
300. See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 18, at 313 (“Information is valuable, to be sure,
but the higher price a party pays for secrecy might deter misbehavior as successfully as any
legal remedy, and the latter normally comes at greater social cost.”).
301. Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv.
L. Rev. 2173, 2174–75 (2014).
302. Id. at 2175.
303. See id. (“[T]he public . . . receives little information about the behind-the-scenes
decisions and negotiations that lead to these plea bargains.”).
304. Indeed, I have criticized plea bargaining for precisely this reason. See John
Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 181, 198 (2015) (noting
that trials, unlike plea bargaining, “shine a light on investigatory behavior and the exercise
of governmental power more generally”).
305. This is a point Professors Levmore and Fagan stress. See Levmore & Fagan, supra
note 18, at 312–13 (noting that settlements and private arbitration proceedings “deprive
the world of information that judicial decisions might convey . . . [and] third parties may
not even know of hazards or facts that are known to the settling parties but costly for
others to rediscover”); see also Murat C. Mungan, The Scope of Criminal Law, in Research
Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law 51, 57 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds.,
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again blunt the critique. Recall, ﬁrst, that, in a world without retail
justice, many retailers call the police infrequently, often banishing
suspected offenders instead.306 Of the suspects who are arrested, many
will escape formal charges or obtain diversion, leaving behind records of
questionable utility for tracking repeat offenders.307
Moreover, retail justice companies keep records for precisely this
purpose—to identify and screen out repeat offenders. To be sure, unless
retailers pool information, this technique will catch only shoplifters who
reoffend at the same retailer or another retailer that contracts with the
same retail justice company,308 so coverage is admittedly imperfect. But
the system likely captures a great number of cases, and the ones that slip
through the cracks probably present little serious danger.309
The third transparency concern: Professor Henry Hart famously
theorized that conduct is “criminal” precisely when (and because) it

2012) (“Criminal law . . . has the function of producing information concerning a
convict’s attitude towards the rest of society and his preferences. . . . Hence, criminal law
may allow other members of society to alter their behavior towards the ex-convict and take
low-cost targeted precautions against him.”).
306. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 128; Konig, supra note
20.
308. See Grover C. Trask, Best Best & Krieger, LLP, California’s Business Community
Restorative Justice Precomplaint Education Program for Petty Theft Offenders 3 (July 31,
2013), https://www.correctiveeducation.com/home/uploads/BBK-White-Paper-MJM-Edits13.07.31.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing CEC’s data-gathering
systems).
309. See Blanco et al., supra note 22, at 907 tbl.2 (showing that individuals who selfreport shoplifting report low rates of violent behavior); Gold & Lang, supra note 102, at 2
(“[M]ost non-professional shoplifters do not commit other types of crimes.”).
Conﬁdentiality of offense records, however, does have another implication that is not so
easily minimized. Conﬁdentiality may inadvertently increase statistical discrimination
against black males seeking employment. See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box,
Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q.J. Econ. 191, 195
(2018) (“[W]hen employers lack individualized information, they tend to generalize that
black applicants, but not white applicants, are likely to have records.”); Harry J. Holzer et
al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of
Employers, 49 J.L. & Econ. 451, 452 (2006) (“If accessibility to criminal history
information is limited . . . employers may infer the likelihood of past criminal activity from
such traits as gender, race, or age [which] disproportionately impact[s] African
Americans.”). If prospective employers—particularly retailers, one might think—cannot
be conﬁdent whether an applicant has shoplifted, they may rely on less accurate and more
odious proxies for criminality, such as race. Landlords, colleges, and other institutions that
screen for criminal records may do the same. In short, even if conﬁdentiality helps black
males who have shoplifted once, the evidence suggests it harms black males whose records
are clean. Because conﬁdentiality “helps black men with records while hurting black men
without records, the net effect on black male employment would depend on the real-world
sizes of these groups.” Agan & Starr, supra, at 229.
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incurs the “moral condemnation of the community.”310 Retail justice
precludes the collective act of public disdain.311 Is this a serious demerit?
We might ask ﬁrst whether, in the most practical sense, retail justice
dampens the message of condemnation the legislature sought to convey by
criminalizing shoplifting. This is an empirical question and, for reasons
related to the discussion of deterrence above, the answer may be no. If,
absent retail justice, the criminal prohibition against shoplifting is grossly
underenforced, then retail justice, by potentially reaching more
offenders, may actually amplify rather than muffle the criminal law’s
message—at least to the principal audience whose behavior it is designed
to control. One thing retail justice companies do, after all, is underscore
the social harms that shoplifting inﬂicts.312 And this seems, signiﬁcantly,
to satisfy retailers’ retributive thirst.
Still, the administration of retail justice involves no public disapproval
of the offender. One might assume this is a problem. For one thing,
holding all else equal, it weakens deterrence.313 It also interferes with
“one of the state’s most important tasks in articulating and enforcing the
criminal law: declaring societal norms in public and labeling as ‘criminal’
the behavior that runs afoul of them.”314 Yet maybe that is the wrong
inference to draw. Perhaps the stronger inference is that the public
authorities, which (with some exceptions) seem at least complicit in the
operation of retail justice, do not believe that most ﬁrst-time shoplifters
deserve public condemnation.
As Part I showed, the historical record reﬂects longstanding ambivalence toward the offense. Legislatures could, after all, enact mandatory
reporting statutes to ensure the private police send every suspected
shoplifter to the public system. But they do not. Nor has any state
legislature made a move to ban retail justice from the marketplace.315
Perhaps, then, it is best to conceptualize what is happening here as a
novel species of decriminalization. There are entirely sensible reasons

310. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs.
401, 405 (1958).
311. See Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1970–71 (arguing that
private settlement of criminal matters is inappropriate because it removes the official
sanction and condemnation of the state); Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, supra note 12,
at 1165–66 (same).
312. See, e.g., C.A. Partnership Program, Turning Point Justice, http://turningpointjustice.
com/Crime-Accountability-Program [https://perma.cc/E66Q-ZAUY] (last visited Aug. 11,
2018) (“With many retailers only making a few cents on the dollar in proﬁts, stealing even
a chocolate bar can quickly reduce store proﬁts that lead to store closings and job losses in
local communities.”).
313. See Hylton, Whom Should We Punish, supra note 188, at 2533 (“[E]xposure of a
crime is a separate punishment by itself.”).
314. Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1970–71.
315. The Minnesota legislature, however, is considering the question. See H.R. 1520,
2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017).
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one might favor such a policy, including the belief that it will reduce,
rather than elevate, the rate of subsequent criminal offending.316
b. Crime Data. — A somewhat different concern is that retail justice
distorts official crime data. Every suspect retail justice companies poach is
a statistic that will not show up in public data recording offenses known
to the police. Jurisdictions in which retail justice companies thrive will
therefore publish crime rates that are artiﬁcially depressed. Shoplifting is
reported in official FBI crime data as “larceny-theft,” which, in turn,
constitutes the largest component of the umbrella category “property
crime.”317
To be sure, even absent the effects of retail justice, selective
reporting and prosecution plague official shoplifting data.318 Various
shoplifting “epidemics,” for instance, may not have been epidemics at all
but rather the manifestation of changes in retailer behavior, such as
increases in the rate of apprehension and police referral.319 To some
extent, though, this dynamic exists for all but the most serious crimes,
which are reported and prosecuted more consistently.320 There is no
reason to think these background measurement errors are distributed
unevenly across jurisdictions in any signiﬁcant way. Retail justice, in
contrast, concentrates and magniﬁes the effects. If a small city’s Walmart
switches from an aggressive police referral policy to CEC, for example,
316. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 39, at 165 (arguing that there may be “a strong
argument in favor of keeping pilferers out of jail lest they receive there the kinds of
knowledge and emotional support they need to become ‘successful’ commercial thieves”);
Klemke, Apprehension for Shoplifting, supra note 191, at 401 (ﬁnding that apprehension
and police contact each increased subsequent shoplifting among juveniles); see also
Samuel Walker, Reform the Law: Decriminalization, in Deviant Behavior 678, 679 (Edward
J. Clarke ed., 7th ed. 2008) (describing the theory that “any contact with the system . . .
imposes a ‘criminal label’ on the individual,” who “internalizes the label and proceeds to
act out the role, committing additional and more serious crimes”).
317. See FBI, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the United States,
2010, Larceny-theft 1 (Sept. 2011), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-inthe-u.s.-2010/property-crime/larcenytheftmain.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMK7-VWHP]; FBI,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the United States, 2010, Property
Crime 2 (Sept. 2011), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/
property-crime/propertycrimemain.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5H2-NBMX] (“Larceny-theft
accounted for 68.1 percent of all property crimes in 2010.”).
318. This is a point Mary Owen Cameron rightly stressed in her inﬂuential 1964 work.
See Cameron, supra note 39, at 23–24.
319. See, e.g., Klemke, Sociology of Shoplifting, supra note 37, at 8 (“[T]he increase
shown in FBI data is more likely to be a product of changes in apprehension and
reporting practices than a real increase in shoplifting behavior.”); Hindelang, supra note
91, at 584 (ﬁnding that, due to changes in the rate at which retailers called the police, the
police would have observed a 32% increase in shoplifting from 1963 to 1968 even if the
number of offenders had not changed).
320. See Jayne E. Robinson & Michael R. Rand, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal
Victimization in the United States, 2008 Statistical Tables 98 tbl.91 (2011), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus08.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFB4-V937] (estimating, for
example, that victims reported 47.1% of crimes of violence but only 33.6% of thefts).
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the drop in official property crime statistics could be instantaneous and
signiﬁcant without any change in the underlying crime rate.
Crime data are central to a variety of personal and policy decisions
in contemporary society.321 Families may consult crime rates when
choosing where to settle.322 Academics use them to research the determinants of crime and potential solutions.323 Governments allocate funds
with crime rates in mind.324 Police officials are evaluated partly on their
ability to drive crime down.325 When retail justice distorts crime data, it
warps these personal and policy decisions too. That is not to say the
effect cuts in any clear direction—it depends on local needs and
incentives. Law enforcement, for example, may support retail justice
when it perceives the beneﬁts from depressing crime rates to outweigh
the cost of resources forgone—or vice versa.
D. Is This Blackmail?
According to the California court ruling on San Francisco’s lawsuit,
CEC’s business model is “textbook extortion.”326 Whether that decision is
correct as a matter of California law is a question better left to other fora.
Answering it, in any event, would not resolve the legality of retail justice
under other states’ blackmail (or extortion) statutes.327 The more fruitful
inquiry is whether the justiﬁcations for prohibiting blackmail support
banning retail justice. Even if retail justice is blackmail, in other words,
should it be unlawful? There is substantial dissensus on whether and why
blackmail should be illegal in the ﬁrst place.328 This section explains why
several leading blackmail theories fail to justify a prohibition on retail
321. See generally Modernizing Crime Statistics 85–102 (Janet L. Lauritsen & Daniel
L. Cork eds., 2016) (providing an overview of the users and uses of crime statistics).
322. Online tools provide detailed information about crime rates for those seeking to
move. See, e.g., Crime Statistics, City-Data, https://www.city-data.com/crime [https://
perma.cc/75KQ-F66A] (last visited Aug. 11, 2018) (providing a map of crime statistics
viewable based on city and state).
323. See Cameron, supra note 39, at 61, 174 (asserting that “the operation of private
police represents a challenging problem in the ﬁeld of criminology” because of its effect
on crime statistics, which are the “basic data on which theories of crime causation are
built”).
324. See Modernizing Crime Statistics, supra note 321, at 91–94.
325. See generally John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The Crime Numbers Game:
Management by Manipulation (2012) (describing incentives for police to manipulate
crime statistics).
326. People ex rel. Herrera v. Corrective Educ. Co., No. CGC-15-549094, slip op. at 3
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2017) (granting summary judgment in part).
327. Cf. Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, supra note 12, at 1191 (“[M]ost states prohibit
incriminating blackmail altogether, but a few allow the practice in limited circumstances.”).
328. See Mitchell N. Berman, Blackmail, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of
Criminal Law 37, 37 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011) [hereinafter Berman,
Blackmail] (“[E]xplaining why blackmail is properly criminalized remains ‘one of the
most elusive intellectual puzzles in all of law.’” (quoting James Lindgren, Blackmail: An
Afterword, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1975, 1975 (1993))).
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justice. Professor James Lindgren’s inﬂuential theory comes closest but
ultimately it, too, falls short.
Assuming for present purposes that the agreements between CEC
and shoplifting suspects are indeed blackmail, they are what commentators call “opportunistic” and “incriminating” (or “crime-exposure”)
blackmail. They are “opportunistic” because the putative blackmailer,
CEC, does not expend resources to acquire the incriminating information; the retailers gather it in the course of ongoing security efforts.329
They are “incriminating” (or “crime-exposing”) because the information
suspects wish to suppress relates to criminal activity, as opposed to, say,
noncriminal but embarrassing personal facts.330 Many leading theories of
blackmail simply do not apply to opportunistic and incriminating
blackmail.331 The discussion below considers only ones that do.
Professor Mitchell Berman’s “evidentiary theory” would criminalize
opportunistic, incriminating blackmail because “it tends both (a) to
cause or threaten identiﬁable harm, and (b) to be undertaken by a
morally blameworthy actor.”332 Berman’s theory is unpersuasive largely
for the reasons Ric Simmons lays out: First, in general, motive is (rightly)
irrelevant to criminality; second, and more important, incriminating
blackmail does not necessarily reveal a “morally blameworthy” motive.333
As Simmons observes, both the Model Penal Code and some state

329. See Mike Hepworth, Blackmail: Publicity and Secrecy in Everyday Life 74–77
(1975) (describing four types of blackmail: entrepreneurial, opportunistic, commercial
research, and participant).
330. See Berman, Blackmail, supra note 328, at 74 (discussing “crime-exposure
blackmail”); Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1935–36 (deﬁning and
discussing “incriminating blackmail”).
331. One prominent theory centers on the resources wasted acquiring, and then
suppressing, information about the blackmail victim. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The 1987
McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 Va. L. Rev. 655, 674 (1988); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul
Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1865
(1993); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail,
Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1877, 1879–80 (1993) [hereinafter Shavall,
Economic Analysis of Threats]. But opportunistic blackmail involves no such purported
waste. See James Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L.
Rev. 597, 601 (1989). The same response dispatches the notion that permitting blackmail
encourages invasions of privacy in search of blackmail material. See Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 Monist 156, 160 (1980). Another theory worries that
“to avoid being blackmailed by [opportunistic blackmailers] . . . potential victims will . . .
reduce their level of innocent, yet embarrassing, activities.” Shavell, Economic Analysis of
Threats, supra, at 1903 (emphasis omitted). But incriminating blackmail does not affect
incentives to engage in innocent conduct. See Berman, Blackmail, supra note 328, at 44
(“It is unclear that the prospect of being blackmailed over innocent activities would be
sufficiently great in a regime of legalized blackmail to have any signiﬁcant effect on the
incidence or manner of their performance.”).
332. Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives
Seriously, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 836 (1998) [hereinafter Berman, Evidentiary Theory].
333. See Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, supra note 12, at 1157–61.
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statutes actually condone certain forms of incriminating blackmail.334
Ohio, for example, provides a defense to blackmail when the blackmailer’s “purpose was limited to . . . [c]ompelling another to refrain
from misconduct or to desist from further misconduct [or] [p]reventing
or redressing a wrong or injustice.”335
As Simmons shows, Berman’s insistence that incriminating blackmail
is morally blameworthy “is contingent upon the premise that we all have
a civic duty to report crime, and it is morally wrong to fail in that duty in
order to pursue one’s goals.”336 According to Berman, such failure “tends
to bespeak a disregard for the common good and the concrete interests
of actual and potential victims.”337
There is certainly not, in the ordinary case, any legal duty upon
citizens to report crime. And whether there is a civic or moral duty seems
questionable, at best. Less than half of all criminal victimizations are
reported (by victims) to the police;338 witnesses likely report crime far less
often than that. Any civic reporting duty is honored only in the breach.
Berman disregards, moreover, the possibility that incriminating
blackmail in fact serves the interests of “actual and potential victims” by
deterring crime, thus fulﬁlling the very same obligations the putative
reporting duty imposes.339
In the shoplifting context, speciﬁcally, it would be strange to
maintain that retailers violate a civic duty to report crime at the same
time public authorities complain they report too often—even
threatening to ﬁne retailers for reporting.340 It would also be odd to say
334. Id. at 1158.
335. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.12(C)(1)–(2) (2018) (internal statutory subsection
references omitted).
336. Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, supra note 12, at 1159; see also, e.g., Joel
Feinberg, The Paradox of Blackmail, 1 Ratio Juris 83, 85–88 (1988) [hereinafter Feinberg,
Paradox of Blackmail] (contending that members of society owe a civic duty to report
crime, even if not a legal one); Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 331, at 1858 (arguing
that incriminating blackmail “default[s] on a duty” to the state to report crime).
337. Berman, Evidentiary Theory, supra note 332, at 861.
338. Jennifer L. Truman & Rachel E. Morgan, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Criminal Victimization, 2015, at 6 tbl.4 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cv15.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9GS-JHZ6] (ﬁnding that 46.5% of violent victimizations
and 34.6% of property victimizations were reported to police in 2015).
339. Berman, Evidentiary Theory, supra note 332, at 861. Likewise, it is far from clear
that blackmail meets Berman’s ﬁrst criterion for criminalization—causing or threatening
identiﬁable harm—when the blackmailer is “achieving some level of punishment and
deterrence at no cost to the state.” See id. at 1161–62 & n.114.
340. The mayor of Beech Grove, Indiana, labeled the city’s Walmart a “public
nuisance,” threatening to ﬁne the company for each subsequent call to the police. See
Laird, supra note 163, at 19. A different account reports that Walmart would be ﬁned only
for subsequent petty-shoplifting calls. See Sampson et al., supra note 100; see also Michael
Gonzalez, Portage Considers Fining Businesses for Calling the Police Too Often, Chi. Trib.:
Post-Trib. (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptbportage-walmart-police-calls-st-0411-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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that CEC disregards victims’ interests when it works at the behest of those
very same victims. And how, moreover, are we to discern CEC’s true
motives? Proﬁt is surely a principal motive, but CEC professes other
plausible motives as well. Berman’s theory cannot resolve these questions.
Landes and Posner argue that “the decision to discourage blackmail
follows directly from the decision to rely on a public monopoly of law
enforcement in . . . criminal law.”341 That public monopoly, in turn,
traces to concerns about under- or overdeterrence: underdeterrence if
blackmailers sell their incriminating information too cheaply;
overdeterrence if they blackmail individuals whom prosecutors, in their
exercise of discretionary nonenforcement, would have left alone.342 Part
II has responded to these arguments already.343 So has Professor Jennifer
Gerarda Brown in her cogent critique of the Landes–Posner position.344
In short, when there is no signiﬁcant problem of judgment-proof
defendants, and little if any efficiency of scale from centralized public
enforcement, there is scant reason to assume the public monopoly on
criminal justice is justiﬁed.345
The blackmail theory that comes closest to supporting a ban on
retail justice is Lindgren’s. Lindgren understands blackmail as “the
seeking of an advantage by threatening to press an actual or potential
dispute that is primarily between the blackmail victim and someone
else.”346 Incriminating blackmail, to Lindgren, is “bargaining with the
state’s chip,”347 which is “unfair in that the threatener uses leverage that
is less his than someone else’s.”348 It also “involves suppressing the state’s
interests.”349 According to Brown, Lindgren “would outlaw blackmail

341. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 42.
342. See id. at 38, 42.
343. See supra sections II.C–.D.
344. See Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1953–58 (challenging
key assumptions Landes and Posner make in their argument). Brown, in turn, would rest
the illegality of incriminatory blackmail largely on the “transparency” arguments I also
dispatched earlier. Compare id. at 1966–73 (identifying public enforcement as “crucial to
the declarative function of criminal law”), with supra section II.C.2 (describing how
criminal justice processes largely exclude the public, thereby undermining transparencyrelated arguments). Brown touches upon “[r]esource disparities,” Brown, Blackmail as
Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1970, and “procedural protections,” id. at 1972, which I
address at supra sections I.A and II.A.1, respectively. Simmons joins me in rejecting
Brown’s arguments. See Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, supra note 12, at 1165–71.
345. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. &
Econ. 255, 276–79 (1993).
346. Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox, supra note 171, at 703.
347. Id. at 702; cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 42 (discussing how blackmail
potentially interferes with state objectives).
348. Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox, supra note 171, at 703.
349. Id. at 672.
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because it harms third parties”—here, the state—“by compromising their
rights.”350
Note that, in acting through the retail justice companies, retailers
may not actually gain any net leverage if they also waive their civilrecovery rights. Even putting that aside, Lindgren’s critics, including
both Brown and Simmons, have the stronger position. They point out
that “the blackmailer ‘appropriates’ the state’s leverage but also creates
some deterrence value that inures to the beneﬁt of the general public.”351
“Nothing is actually being ‘stolen’ from the state,” in other words; rather,
the blackmailer “is advancing the state’s goals (at least part of the way)
and saving the state money.”352
One can also read Lindgren, however, as worried about the blackmailer’s unjust gain rather than the blackmail victim’s loss.353 Indeed, this
reading, more than any other theory, likely captures our intuition about
the “wrongness” of retail justice: Even if we posit that retail justice
beneﬁts suspects, victims, and society more broadly (by deterring
shoplifting efficiently), why should retail justice companies be permitted
to proﬁt from appropriating the state’s leverage?
As Berman has argued, however, and as Lindgren later conceded,354
Lindgren’s theory is better at describing blackmail than justifying its
prohibition. “Lindgren provides no reason,” Berman writes, “why use of
someone else’s leverage for individual gain should be made unlawful, let
alone criminal.”355 “Furthermore,” Berman adds, “if the use of such
leverage is wrongful, it’s not clear why the squandering of another’s

350. Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1963.
351. Id. at 1965.
352. Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, supra note 12, at 1156. Indeed, it is not
completely clear that Lindgren would oppose the retail justice model. Lindgren allows
that “permit[ting] one to threaten exposure of a . . . crime when honestly seeking
restitution in a matter related to the exposure . . . may be an appropriate rule” under his
theory, “since the threatener’s personal interest is likely to be substantial when the claim
pressed is related to the information threatened to be exposed.” Lindgren, Unraveling the
Paradox, supra note 171, at 715. The issue, to Lindgren, would largely turn on whether
the retail justice companies’ fees exceed “any reasonable restitution.” Id.
353. See Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 363 n.45 (1988); Brown, Blackmail as
Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1963–64.
354. James Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1975, 1988 (1993).
355. Berman, Blackmail, supra note 328, at 54 (emphasis added); see also Feinberg,
Paradox of Blackmail, supra note 336, at 83–85 (arguing that an undeserved gain is
insufficient, in a liberal society, to justify criminalization when there is no corresponding
harm); cf. Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution 26 (2004) (arguing that
unjust enrichment is not a legal argument but a “loose framework as well as an invitation
for normative inquiry”); Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the
Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2083, 2110 (2001) (advocating an
understanding of unjust enrichment “as an organizing principle rather than a decisional
standard”).
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chips—by deciding neither to threaten nor to make a given disclosure—
is not likewise wrongful and thus properly criminalizable.”356
In the end, that retail justice may qualify as blackmail under some
(perhaps many) state statutes does not tell us that the reasons for its
prohibition are well founded. Blackmail laws have always rested on shaky
theoretical footing. And the theories that may justify prohibiting
blackmail in certain settings do not extend persuasively to the case of
retail justice.
III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Close examination of retail justice paints a ﬁner picture than
popular press accounts can afford. Even a casual observer, to be sure, can
compile a laundry list of qualms about the industry. But no shorter is the
list of (well-founded) grievances about public criminal justice. After
careful reﬂection, it is not clear that retail justice is worse than its public
counterpart, and in several important respects it may be better.
This conclusion holds, however, only if certain conditions—
suggested in the preceding discussion and crystallized in this Part—are
met. The normative valence of retail justice, that is, depends upon
empirical facts about how it is implemented and the environments in
which it operates. Rather than ignoring retail justice or trying to stamp it
out, lawmakers can help ensure that it operates fairly by regulating it in
the following respects.
First, in most circumstances, the availability of retail justice makes
shoplifting suspects better off by allowing them to opt out of the criminal
justice system, with all its dangers and lingering legal consequences. The
exceptional case is one in which the suspect harbors misconceptions
about the criminal justice system—believing the expected sanctions to be
harsher than they really are—and thus artiﬁcially inﬂates the beneﬁts of
avoidance. So, while retail justice should not be prohibited under the
banner of protecting suspects’ interests, the state should ensure that
retail justice companies do not mislead suspects about the severity of the
criminal justice option. And if resources for enforcing this antifraud rule
are scarce, they should be focused on jurisdictions in which criminal
justice is particularly lenient, where the risk of misapprehension is
highest.357
Second, in many settings, society might prefer retail justice to
criminal justice because it generates deterrence more efficiently.
Essentially, the “tuition” fees suspects pay to retail justice companies

356. Berman, Blackmail, supra note 328, at 54–55.
357. A more aggressive approach might be to require Miranda-style warnings that
inform the suspect about the rate at which prosecutors in the jurisdiction pursue charges
against ﬁrst-time shoplifters, the range and distribution of sentences upon conviction, and
the procedural rights available to arrestees and defendants.
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serve as ﬁnes that are administered at lower cost than criminal justice
sanctions. If, however, retailers could prevent crime even more cheaply
by investing in precautions, then retail justice allows retailers to pursue
private gains at the expense of social welfare and should be curtailed.
The difficulty is how to identify these settings. One possibility is to
require retailers to demonstrate compliance with industry best practices
for loss prevention as a precondition to opting into retail justice.358 In the
long run, one could even imagine a municipal “loss prevention code,”
akin to a ﬁre code, applicable to retailers above a certain size.
Third, because it buries criminal violations, retail justice distorts
official crime data. Given the interest in, and manifold uses of, these data
in contemporary society, states should require retail justice companies to
publish aggregate data about the cases they process. An analogy is the
Clery Act,359 which regulates the reporting of campus crime. While
colleges and universities are not required to call the local police
whenever they learn about crimes committed on campus, the Clery Act
does obligate them to keep and disclose information about certain
offenses. Institutions subject to the Clery Act must track and publish
crime statistics and maintain public logs with details about each such
incident brought to their attention.360 Clery Act offenses are more
serious than shoplifting; nevertheless, given the volume and economic
impact of retail theft, reasonable people (say, prospective business
owners) may value aggregate shoplifting data in planning their affairs.361
Fourth, the distributive effects of retail justice are indeterminate.
Many of the potential racial and economic biases that concern critics of
retail justice manifest to the same degree in the criminal justice system. It
is possible that retail justice could exacerbate bias—for instance, by
incorporating bias from suspects’ prior interactions with the police. Yet
this is true only if this bias is stronger than those of retailers that exercise
discretion in determining when to call the police, many of which may
look at the suspect’s record in addition to other personal characteristics.
This seems unlikely, though vigilance is appropriate given the stakes.
Data reporting by retail justice companies should therefore include
information on the race and gender of suspects, as well as the locations
358. See, e.g., Loss Prevention Found., How Loss Prevention Audits Are Used, LPM Insider
(May 17, 2018), http://losspreventionmedia.com/insider/inventory-shrinkage/lp101-howloss-prevention-audits-are-used-2 [https://perma.cc/9QRZ-R4UW] (“The purpose [of a lossprevention audit] is to reinforce guiding principles and practices that should already be
familiar to those being audited and evaluate compliance with known standards of
performance.”).
359. Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104 Stat. 2384 (1990) (codiﬁed at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012)).
360. See id.
361. See, e.g., Modernizing Crime Statistics, supra note 321, at 98 (“Businesses may
use [Uniform Crime Report] crime data to learn about the nature and extent of problems
in the cities or communities in which they operate or are considering for expansion or
relocation opportunities.”).
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of operation, to allow for state and public monitoring of disparate
impacts.
Finally, because, under ordinary circumstances, retail justice has the
potential to make everyone better off, prosecutors should refrain from
enforcing blackmail laws against the retail justice industry, absent
particularized concerns including those ﬂagged throughout Part II. In
the long run, if the retail justice experiment is successful, lawmakers
might consider amending blackmail laws, where necessary, to ensure they
do not prohibit the practice.
IV. EXTENSIONS
Beyond its parochial signiﬁcance, the study of retail justice also
generates fresh perspectives on several important criminal justice issues.
This Part draws out these points. Section IV.A extracts lessons for
institutional design from the discussion in section II.C of victims’
incentives to take precautions. Section IV.B demonstrates how retail
justice challenges conventional views about police and prosecutorial
motives. Finally, section IV.C speculates about the possible next frontiers
of private criminal dispute resolution.
A.

Lessons for Criminal Justice System Design

Recall the conclusion that, while retail justice may reduce the sum of
prevention and enforcement costs relative to the criminal justice system,
victim precautions might reduce costs even further. This insight extends
in interesting directions. Most economically minded legal scholarship on
criminal justice, as noted earlier, analyzes offenders’ incentives alone.
Only a handful of writers discuss the role of victim precautions in
reducing crime. They have emphasized the ways in which the substantive
criminal law is, or could be, used to encourage efficient precautions. For
example, the tendency of the criminal law to punish attempts more
leniently than completed crimes can be understood as a way of
discouraging excessive private investment in precautions, which, by
thwarting some completed crimes, turn them into mere attempts.362
What is true of the substantive criminal law is also true of criminal
procedure and the design of criminal justice institutions. Just as the rules
of criminal law can alter victims’ incentives to invest in precautions, so
can other aspects of the criminal process. When returns on participation
in the criminal justice system increase sufficiently from the victim’s
perspective, victims will begin to rely on the criminal justice system when
they would have previously invested in precautions—even where
precautions remain more cost-effective from society’s vantage point.
362. See Ben-Shahar & Harel, Economics, supra note 31, at 341–42; see also Harel,
Efficiency and Fairness, supra note 270, at 1211–26 (discussing provocation, the “no
retreat” rule, and the classiﬁcation of property crimes).
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Precautions and public law enforcement are substitutes, as others have
noted.363
This substitution effect, in turn, generates two observations. First, in
contexts in which cost-effective precautions against crime are available, a
criminal process that is costly and cumbersome from the victim’s
perspective—while doubtless frustrating to the victim—may be socially
beneﬁcial if it encourages victims to invest in efficient precautions.364
Second, wholly apart from the many other downsides of an overweening
criminal justice system,365 an outsized apparatus may have the additional,
unrecognized disadvantage of discouraging certain victims from taking
socially efficient precautions. There are important (and illuminating)
limits on the reach of this argument, but ﬁrst consider the basic point.
Suppose the police in my neighborhood excel at catching bicycle
thieves—they have ample manpower and spare no expense in tracking
down a stolen bike. Suppose they have also made it simple for me to ﬁle a
bicycle-theft report via a smartphone application. In this world, it would
be sorely tempting not to spend money on a professional-grade lock for
my bike and not to go out of my way to ﬁnd a rack every time I need to
park. If my bike disappears, I will ﬁle a report and the police will get my
bike back—using taxpayer resources far greater than what the lock and
minor route deviations would have cost me.
Now suppose there is no convenient smartphone app—to ﬁle a theft
report, I have to get myself to the police station, wait in line, provide
ownership documentation, and ﬁll out a stack of paperwork. That lock
and those bike racks start to look much more attractive, a salutary shift
from society’s perspective. Similarly, suppose that ﬁling a report remains
easy but the likelihood of recovery is greatly reduced because the police
department is resource constrained. Again, investment in private
precautions begins to sound more appealing, which is socially beneﬁcial.

363. See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter, Public Services, Private Substitutes, and the
Demand for Protection Against Crime, 5 J. Urb. Econ. 388, 393 (1978); Tomas J. Philipson
& Richard A. Posner, The Economic Epidemiology of Crime, 39 J.L. & Econ. 405, 407–11
(1996).
364. A similar point may hold for criminal procedure protections like the reasonable
doubt rule, which reduce expected returns on victim participation in the criminal process.
For a similar argument in the property law context, see Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchamovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of Property Rights, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1927, 1932–40 (2012).
365. See, e.g., Exec. Office of the President of the U.S., Economic Perspectives on
Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System 43–45, 50–52 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160423_cea_incarceration_criminal_justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KJF8-VD8T] (documenting direct government spending on the criminal
justice system along with costs imposed on offenders’ families and communities); Dorothy
E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271, 1281–300, 1304 (2004) (discussing how mass
incarceration is “damaging social networks, distorting social norms, and destroying social
citizenship” in African American communities).
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That the criminal justice system and private precautions are
substitutes tells us something not only about the size or type of criminal
justice system we might want but also how to allocate enforcement
resources within that system. More speciﬁcally, the desire to avoid distorting victim incentives supplies an argument for directing enforcement
resources toward certain victims and crimes rather than others.
Regarding victims, there is no concern about reducing investment
incentives among individuals who lack the resources to make the
investments in the ﬁrst place. In other words, while a cheap, effective
criminal process may reduce investment in socially efficient precautions
among the wealthy (like retailers), it is unlikely to affect the spending
patterns of the poor. The debate about whether the criminal law is overor underenforced in poor communities—especially poor communities of
color—is fraught and complex.366 The suggestion here is only that the
victim-precaution angle supplies one argument in favor of those who
would prefer greater enforcement in these settings.
Just as the substitution argument may apply to some victims but not
others, the same is true for crimes. Here, too, it makes sense to allocate
criminal justice enforcement resources where they will not lead victims to
forgo spending on socially efficient precautions. In some contexts, for
example, there may be no accessible, efficient precautions because
available precautions are ineffective or unduly expensive (in either
ﬁnancial or personal terms). In other contexts, the private harms of
victimization—which ordinarily are not compensated through the
criminal process—may be so substantial that victims will continue to take
precautions even when law enforcement is effective and inexpensive for
the victim.
* * *
The preceding discussion may help make sense of public hostility
toward Walmart’s heavy demands on the criminal justice system. As a
taxpayer, Walmart is entitled to some basic level of public protection,
regardless whether it takes socially efficient precautions to prevent crime
on its premises. But when it begins to make excessive demands on the
criminal justice system—demands, perhaps, beyond those it would make
if it did take efficient precautions—then continuing to meet those
demands begins to look more like (regressive) redistribution than merely

366. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 10–12, 364–86 (1997)
(discussing different ideological positions on policing and crime in African American
communities); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 197, 206–11 (arguing that
some concerns around police overenforcement in inner-city and minority communities
erroneously assume that those communities oppose higher levels of policing); David
Thacher, The Distribution of Police Protection, 27 J. Quantitative Criminology 275, 284–
86 (2011).
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spreading the costs of crime across the tax base.367 At this point, it only
seems right that Walmart itself, or the consumers who choose to
patronize it, pay the excess. By reducing the value of criminal justice
assistance to Walmart, we may encourage Walmart to shift its deterrence
strategy away from enforcement and toward prevention.
B.

Police and Prosecutorial Motives

Acquiescence in retail justice, section II.C.2 argued, may best be
understood as an exercise, rather than abdication, of police and
prosecutorial discretion. It is discretion at the wholesale level. But why
are the public authorities exercising their discretion in this way? Put
differently, what can acquiescence in retail justice tell us about police and
prosecutorial preferences and priorities?
Legal scholars tend to assume that prosecutors seek to maximize
either their convictions or conviction rates, often because these are
thought to be the measures by which they are evaluated for promotion or
election.368 The retail justice story challenges this position. Most
shoplifting cases are easy wins for prosecutors—the stolen goods are
recovered and surveillance footage captures the offender in the act. Plea
deals come quickly. Prosecutors ﬁxated on collecting convictions would
be foolish to cut off this ﬂow of easy wins. Likewise, if police aimed to
maximize arrests, as some maintain,369 why would they not push hard
against, rather than encourage, an arrangement that steals easy ones out
from under their gaze?
What retail justice suggests instead is something like a crime-control
model of prosecutorial and police behavior. As long as they are assured
that retailers are taking care of the problem and not allowing thieves to
run rampant through their stores, prosecutors and police seem generally
content to focus their attention and resources on other problems. Again,
this is not because there are not arrests to be made and convictions to be
counted—there are (and cheap ones). But the resources are better spent
elsewhere. This behavior seems less consistent with a convictionmaximizing hypothesis than with models in which the goal is to
maximize social welfare or deterrence subject to a budget constraint.370

367. See Harel, Efficiency and Fairness, supra note 270, at 1207–08 (discussing an
“equal costs” model for distribution of protection).
368. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
370. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal
Stud. 289, 295–96 (1983). It is also consistent with a model in which law enforcement
authorities maximize both social welfare and their own career prospects. See, e.g., Edward
L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of
Drug Crimes, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 259, 288 (2000). Sticking it to shoplifters probably
never made any cop or prosecutor’s career.
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Recall CEC’s ultimate vision: “to reinvent the way petty crimes are
handled, starting with retail theft.”371 If retail theft is just the beginning
for the industry, what comes next? Put another way, what characteristics
of the retail setting have fostered these private justice institutions, and
are there other settings that share the same traits? Several conditions, it
seems, conduce to the particular model of “offender-funded” private
justice the retail justice companies embody. The claim is not that each of
these conditions is strictly necessary on its own, but rather that, the more
that are satisﬁed, the more likely it is that “offender-funded” private
justice will work.
First, the stakes are low in the typical shoplifting case—the average
take is $129.372 This allows retail justice companies to extract fees
sufficiently high to deter future thefts and thus protect victim and thirdparty interests. Given offenders’ solvency limits, the same is unlikely to be
true for more serious crimes.373 Moreover, because retailers at least partly
internalize the risks of recidivism, they are unlikely to opt for private
justice when it would underdeter;374 police and prosecutors would be less
likely to step aside in such a case as well.
Second, shoplifters are typically nonviolent. Were the contrary true,
private justice companies might be more reluctant to take responsibility
for suspects because of physical safety risks to their employees and potential future victims.375 Any concerns about underdeterrence would be
heightened as well.
Third, shoplifting has identiﬁable victims, in contrast with so-called
“victimless” crimes like drug use or prostitution. Victims are the most
obvious candidates to initiate the private justice process.376 Moreover,
shoplifting victims often know who the offenders are. Perhaps not
“often” in an absolute sense, if it is true that shoplifters are apprehended
only one time in forty-eight.377 But when an offender’s identity will ever
be known, the chances are high the victim knows it through in-store
surveillance—only infrequently will police investigation supply the
information.378
371. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 34, at 11 (emphasis added).
372. See Rainey & Hobbs, supra note 281.
373. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 42; Levmore & Fagan, supra note 18, at 326,
328.
374. See supra notes 280–281 and accompanying text.
375. See Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, supra note 171, at 1940.
376. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 32 (discussing the need for a system of
bounties to create incentives for private enforcement of laws prohibiting “victimless”
crimes).
377. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
378. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 31–32 (comparing the probability of a
tortfeasor being apprehended with the probability of a party in breach of contract being
apprehended).
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Fourth, a relatively small number of victims each suffers a huge
number of thefts.379 This reduces transaction costs by allowing private
justice companies to proﬁt from contracting with a few major clients.
Were the number of incidents much lower and dispersed among victims,
not only would transaction costs rise, but also private justice companies
might need to raise enrollment fees. This would reduce the rate at which
suspects enrolled, as private justice became unaffordable or, at the least,
less appealing relative to the criminal justice system. It might also
heighten the sense that private justice companies are exploiting suspects,
attracting state attention.
Finally, shoplifting victims have few appealing options for sanctioning offenders other than calling the police. “Offender-funded” private
justice is, in a sense, a method of outsourcing sanctions. In some settings,
the nature of the relationship between offender and victim will allow for
ﬂexible and tailored (nonlegal) sanctions internal to the relationship.
This is not the case for retailers and their arms-length customers.
Where else, then, might these conditions be present? The retail
setting itself supplies one obvious example, as shoplifting is not the only
prevalent form of retail theft. Theft by employees only narrowly trails
shoplifting as the leading source of inventory shrinkage.380 The average
take is higher for employees than shoplifters,381 which might suggest the
need for a higher fee to achieve adequate deterrence. At the same time,
the employment relationship allows the employer to monitor its
employees closely, achieving some deterrence through means other than
the fee.
It is possible that many retailers prefer to use job-related sanctions—
such as demotions, job transfers, or pay reductions—to punish
employees who steal. This could explain why CEC’s employee-targeted
program appears to be slow to launch.382 But it is also not implausible to
imagine employers that would prefer to keep discipline separate from

379. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
380. See Hollinger, 2017 Survey, supra note 21, at 8.
381. See Rainey & Hobbs, supra note 281 (reporting that employees stole an average
of $715 compared to $129 stolen by customers).
382. CEC seems to be trying to penetrate the employment market. In 2014, the
company announced a program called “CEC Return” to help retailers address employee
theft. See Press Release, CEC, Corrective Education Company Announces CEC Return, a
Restorative Justice Education Program that Addresses Employee Theft, MarketWired (Oct.
13, 2014), http://www.marketwired.com/ press-release/Corrective-Education-CompanyAnnounces-CEC-Return-Restorative-Justice-Education-1956856.htm/ [https://perma.cc/
6HFW-8VM9]. There is little information available about CEC Return. In 2016, the company
then premiered a program called “CEC Retain,” “an employee engagement offering used to
prevent employee theft and more fully engage new employees.” See Corrective Education
Company (CEC) Expands Its Product Line and Sales Team, CEC (June 16, 2016),
https://www.correctiveeducation.com/ home/ blog/ corrective-education-company-cecexpands-its-product-line-and-sales-team (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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the terms and conditions of employment, to maximize the chances of
restoring and preserving the employment relationship.
Another example might be a landlord who oversees a large number
of rental units in an urban setting. The landlord, just by the odds, likely
encounters all sorts of nonviolent, low-level criminal offenses on her
properties, including drug use (or distribution) and noise violations.
Doing nothing may be unappealing, as these crimes likely depress rental
values, making the landlord a “victim” of even so-called “victimless”
crimes. Calling the police, as in the retail environment, may be
time-consuming, ineffectual, and frightening to current or prospective
tenants. Eviction is surprisingly expensive.383 Compared to these more
traditional options, an “offender-funded” model of private justice has a
certain appeal.
There is also the possibility of a different, plausible model of forproﬁt private justice. Instead of outsourcing sanctions, private justice
could outsource adjudication. Consider two examples. University disciplinary committees frequently adjudicate student crimes committed on
campus—from the mundane, like vandalism, to the explosive, like sexual
assault.384 The school’s continuing relationship with its students makes
available sanctioning mechanisms—like academic probation or
suspension—that may be preferable to what an external provider
(including a court) can offer. If, however, a private justice company can
adjudicate cases more efficiently, schools might pay them to handle this
part of the process.
Likewise, many employers—not just retailers battling employee
theft—handle on-the-job crimes in-house.385 It is possible that some
would prefer to outsource adjudication and then impose job-related
sanctions on those found guilty. Of course, nothing would stop an
employer (or university) from outsourcing both adjudication and
sanctions. The decision presumably would turn on a comparison of the
383. See, e.g., Lucas Hall, The True Cost of Eviction Is More than $5,000, Landlordology
(July 17, 2015), http://www.landlordology.com/cost-to-evict-a-tenant [https://perma.cc/
D9BN-WNGX]; see also Matthew Desmond, Evicted 114 (2016) (pegging the cost of
eviction at $600 in low-income areas of Milwaukee from 2008 to 2009).
384. See, e.g., Collin Binkley et al., College Disciplinary Boards Impose Slight
Penalties for Serious Crimes, Columbus Dispatch (Nov. 23, 2014), https://
www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/11/ 23/ campus-injustice.html [https://
perma.cc/K2QD-27SW] (“Colleges . . . use campus disciplinary boards to pass judgment
on students accused of violent crimes, including rape and assault. Sometimes, schools
handle crime and punishment without ever reporting violations to police. Most cases
never go to court.”); see also id. (discussing cases involving trespassing, theft, and property
destruction).
385. See, e.g., C.D. Shearing & P.C. Stenning, Private Security and Private Justice: The
Challenge of the 80s, at 31 (1983) (“Systems which have been established within industry
and commerce for disciplining workers are the epitome of . . . ‘systems of private justice’
and are increasingly supplanting the criminal justice process . . . as the means of dealing
with crime in industry.”).
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sanctioning alternatives, likely focusing on cost-effectiveness, including
consequences for the future of the relationship.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars long have focused on the role of police and
prosecutors as gatekeepers for the criminal justice system.386 How these
actors exercise their discretion determines who escapes the criminal
justice system’s net and who is entangled within it. This Article highlights
how late to the game police and prosecutors can be—the station house
phone rings only when the private gatekeepers that precede them place
the call. In these settings, the question is not whether individuals
suspected of crime will enter the justice system but rather which justice
system—public or private—will assess their guilt and administer any
necessary sanctions.

386. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 Temp. Pol.
& C.R. L. Rev. 369, 369 (2010) (describing prosecutors as the “key gatekeepers who ration
criminal justice”); Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128
Harv. L. Rev. Forum 268, 272, 276–78 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/vol128_GersteinPrescott.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7A7-PYRT] (describing
how police exercise of the discretionary power to arrest shapes criminal justice outcomes).
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